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FOREWORD
Virtually everyone in a civilized society would declare support for the "rule
of law." But few are given the chance to reflect on just what this notion means
and, more particularly, whether achieving it in the international sphere is
possible. Yet that is just what the participants of the Brandeis Institute for
International Judges ("BIIJ") did in July 2010. Sixteen judges from a wide
variety of international courts and tribunals came together to debate whether the
rule of law does or can exist at the international level and to discuss what roles
their institutions play in its establishment.
We gathered in the contemplative atmosphere of the Schloss Leopoldskron, a
grand historic residence outside of Salzburg, Austria, for the seventh session of
the BHJ. As always in this unique forum, Brandeis convened international judges
from nearly every continent and from virtually all of the international courts and
tribunals in the world, allowing each participant to discover anew what a small
world we live in and how often we face similar legal issues. And as always, the
personal connections made between participants were immediate and palpable.
Brandeis University offered the judges in attendance at BIIJ 2010 a rare
combined gift of time, space, and intellectual stimulus, allowing them to delve
deeply into the issues surrounding the definition of the "rule of law" and the
forms it assumes at the international level.
Many kernels of wisdom on these and related questions emerged from our
discussions in Salzburg. This report wonderfully captures these insights, while
respecting the confidentiality of all speakers and the spirit of openness that
characterized our conversations. Readers will, I believe, be able to both discern
the enduring commitment to the rule of law felt by participants and appreciate the
challenges they face as they strive to uphold and reinforce its mandates in the
international arena.
I was honored to be a participant and presenter at BIIJ 2010. I know I speak
for everyone at the Institute when I thank the staff of Brandeis University's
International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, and our academic friends
and colleagues, for bringing us together to learn from one another, to develop
bonds across our institutions, and to debate some of the most critical issues in
international justice of our time. We wish the Brandeis Institute for International
Judges every success in the future.
Jennifer Hillman
World Trade Organization Appellate Body
BIIJ 2009 & 2010
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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
From July 25-30, 2010, sixteen judges from thirteen international courts and
tribunals gathered in Salzburg, Austria for the seventh Brandeis Institute for
International Judges ("BIIJ").
The BIIJ provides members of the international judiciary with the
opportunity to meet and discuss critical issues concerning the theory and practice
of international justice. Institutes are held approximately every eighteen months,
bringing together judges serving on international courts and tribunals around the
world to reflect on the practical challenges as well as philosophical aspects of
their work. The proceedings of each Institute are summarized in a report that is
distributed widely in the international legal community.'
The judges at BIIJ 2010 represented a wide spectrum of international justice
institutions, including long-time participants such as the International Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of Human
Rights; as well as two institutions participating for the first time: the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon.
The theme of this year's Institute, "Toward an International Rule of Law,"
encompassed topics including fairness in international judicial institutions, the
accessibility of international courts and tribunals, and the impact of diversity on
the establishment of an international rule of law. The Institute also continued a
tradition of examining ethical issues faced by members of the international
judiciary. Sessions were led by Institute co-directors, presenters, and members of
the BIIJ program committee.
In addition to these thematic discussions, the Institute featured a keynote
address by Patricia O'Brien, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs, as well as an informal session led by Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court Anthony Kennedy.
Since 2002, Brandeis University has hosted more than eighty international
judges and law experts at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges.
Participants have met in Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, and the United States to
reflect on their unique profession, share best practices, and expand their judicial
network.2
The Brandeis Institute for International Judges 2010 was funded by the
MacArthur Foundation, the Rice Family Foundation, and the David Berg
Foundation.
1. Reports of past Institutes may be downloaded at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/intemationaljustice/
biij/index.html.
2. BIIJ participants are granted anonymity for remarks offered during the discussions in order to allow
them to speak frankly about any sensitive matters that arise. Thus, this report does not attribute statements to
particular individuals without their explicit permission. It furthermore uses the masculine personal pronoun,
regardless of the speaker's gender, in order to ensure that a judge cannot be identified.
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PARTICIPATING JUDGES
African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)
• Gerard Niyungeko, President (Burundi)
• Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria)
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)
• Adrian Saunders (St. Vincent and the Grenadines)
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
• Nina Vaji6 (Croatia)
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
• Motoo Noguchi (Japan)
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
• Alberto Prez P~rez (Uruguay)
International Criminal Court (ICC)
- Hans Peter Kaul, Second Vice-President (Germany)
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
• Hisashi Owada, President (Japan)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
• Theodor Meron (United States)
• Fausto Pocar (Italy)
• Patrick Robinson, President (Jamaica)
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
- Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russian Federation)
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
* Helmut Tuerk, Vice-President (Austria)
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
• Jon Kamanda, President (Sierra Leone)
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL)
* Daniel Fransen (Belgium)
World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB)
• Jennifer Hillman (United States)
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Co-directors
- Richard Goldstone, retired Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, former
Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda
- Linda Carter, Professor, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific
Presenters
" Linda Carter
• St6phanie Cartier, Professor, Fordham University
" Richard Goldstone
• Jennifer Hillman, BIIJ Program Committee Member
" Anthony Kennedy, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
* Theodor Meron
" Patricia O'Brien, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs
* Fatsah Ouguergouz, BIIJ Program Committee Member
" Fausto Pocar, Bil Program Committee Member
" Leigh Swigart, Director of Programs in International Justice and Society,
International Center for Ethics, Justice, and Public Life,
Brandeis University
- Daniel Terris, Director, International Center or Ethics,
Justice, and Public Life, Brandeis University
Rapporteurs
- Micaela Neal, Student, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific
- Cheri Reynolds, Student, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific
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KEY INSTITUTE THEMES
Since the Brandeis Institute for International Judges was first held in 2002,
the world of international justice has evolved considerably. A number of new
courts and tribunals have come into operation, including the International
Criminal Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the African Court of Human
and Peoples' Rights, the Caribbean Court of Justice, the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The result is
that more regions of the world now have access to international judicial
processes, and serious legal issues have come under international scrutiny. The
jurisprudence produced by international judges over the past decade has
furthermore had a powerful impact on the development of law in many fields.
The present moment also finds the mandates of several international criminal
tribunals coming to a close, inspiring scholars and observers to ponder the legacy
they will leave behind as well as the lessons to be derived from their successes
and shortcomings. The closure of these institutions calls perhaps even more
attention to the justice institutions that are permanent and have global reach. The
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the World Trade Organization Appellate
Body will assume primary responsibility for fighting impunity and bringing
about the peaceful resolution of disputes in the years to come.
At the conclusion of BIIJ 2009 in Trinidad, Institute directors and organizers
took stock of the various discussions that had occurred over the preceding days.
They noted, in particular, a recurring reference to what participants viewed as an
evolving sense of the power of international law and respect for its mandates. It
was decided that developing an Institute program around the theme "Toward an
International Rule of Law" would allow for a fruitful exploration at BIIJ 2010 of
the role that international law and its institutions can and do play in the
contemporary world. Discussions centered around six themes:
" What is the International Rule of Law?
* Fairness in International Judicial Institutions
• The Accessibility of International Courts and Tribunals
" The Impact of International Justice
* What Does Diversity Imply for an International Rule of Law?
• Topics in Ethical Practice: Challenges to Judicial Independence
The following is a summary of these discussions.
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What is the International Rule of Law?
".. . the rule of law in the international order is, to a considerable extent
at least, the domestic rule of law writ large. "'
.. . analysis of the role of the Rule of Law as applied at the
international level requires a reconceptualization of the principle in such
a way as to take account of systemic differences between the domestic
and international legal order. ,4
Few would dispute the desirability of establishing and maintaining the rule of
law across the globe. Finding common agreement on the precise meaning of this
concept, however, is less easy to achieve. Frequently invoked and promoted in
the discourse of legal practitioners, lawmakers, and development experts alike,
the semantic content of the term "rule of law" is not a constant but instead
depends upon who uses it and to what purpose.
Extending the notion of the rule of law beyond its habitual domestic context
and into an international one further complicates the search for broad agreement
on its definition. This is clear from the quotations beginning this section, which
presume different relationships between the domestic and international legal
orders. This difficulty also became immediately apparent as BIIJ 2010
participants began their first session, devoted to sketching out the broad outlines
of the "international rule of law."
The launching point for this exercise was a comparison between the rule of
law at the domestic and international levels. There was general consensus about
essential elements that belong to both, including equality before the law, strict
observance of due process, and judicial independence. Several participants
offered what they personally viewed as the central tenets of the rule of law.
"Whether at the domestic or international level, sovereignty over arbitrariness is
the essential meaning of the rule of law," declared a criminal judge. "The rule of
law means that no one is above the law, including the authorities," said a judge
from a human rights court. Furthermore, he continued, "The law to which
everyone submits cannot be an oppressive law but one that protects human
rights."
It was suggested that the principles that emerged from the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
convened in Copenhagen at the end of the Cold War era, provide a good
elaboration of the rule of law at the domestic level (see excerpt on p. 212-14).
These principles "represent the international standards we expect states to apply,"
declared a participant, although another cautioned that they represent "more a
3. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 111 (2010).
4. Hisashi Owada, The Rule of Law in a Globalizing World, in THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM
AROUND THE GLOBE 155 (Francis Neate ed., 2009).
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blueprint than a reality." Central to the so-called "Copenhagen Principles" are
basic human rights guarantees in addition to procedural ones. The United Nations
("U.N.") also employs a definition that encompasses both kinds of guarantees.
Not all BIIJ participants accepted, however, that the rule of law concept
should cover both kinds of guarantees. One judge felt strongly that individual
rights are essentially procedural rights, adding, "I find it hard to conceive of a
substantive application of the principles of the rule of law that has any meaning
without procedural rules," Another judge concurred, pointing out that in certain
countries during the Soviet era, the laws were "perfectly done" and included
extensive human rights protections. "But the laws were not applied, or they were
applied arbitrarily," which resulted in an overall absence of the rule of law.
The converse situation was also noted, one where existing domestic laws
were strictly observed but flawed from a human rights perspective. This was the
case in both Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, where the systematic
disenfranchisement of certain minorities was based on duly enacted laws that
were, nevertheless, unjust. In the same light, one participant brought up the
infamous mid-nineteenth century Dred Scott decision of the United States
Supreme Court, which ruled that slaves and former slaves were not citizens and,
as such, could not pursue a lawsuit in federal court where jurisdiction was based
on the parties being citizens of different states. Dred Scott was viewed as the
"property" of his "owner." The participant described this as "the worst decision
ever penned by any judge in any country in any era.",
6
While all participants seemed to agree that procedural principles of the rule
of law are critical-that "they undergird all substantive principles," as one judge
expressed it-most also felt that a proper conceptualization of the rule of law
necessarily includes both kinds of principles. The rule of law is much more than
"rule by the laws," asserted one judge, the former being both broader and deeper.
Participants suggested that human dignity is the foundation of both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the rule of law.
Participants also concurred in a general way that there already exists a rule of
law at the international level, at least in an emergent form. However, it was
pointed out that there are important differences between the international and
domestic levels that need to be acknowledged.
The separation of powers, for example, is often indicated as a crucial element
in the domestic rule of law. But where does this element fit into the international
context? There is an international judiciary, of course, of which the BIIJ
participants are themselves representatives. But from what exactly does this
judiciary need to maintain separation in order to uphold the rule of law? There is
5. See Patricia O'Brien, Keynote Address at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges: Toward an
International Rule of Law 2 (July 29, 2010), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info-from -l/
Brandeis%20Institute%20for%20Intemational%20Judges,%20Salzburg,%2029%20July%202010.pdf.
6. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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no international legislature, strictly speaking, although there is a body of
international law, composed of international treaties and customary international
law. One participant argued that the appearance that international decision-
making is a kind of lawmaking may lead to conservatism on the part of
international judges. This is because they wish to avoid the appearance of
overreaching their authority to interpret the law in the absence of a lawmaking
branch that can respond to judicial determinations.
What, then, about an executive branch in the international sphere? It was
suggested that the Security Council acts as the executive for courts that operate
under the aegis of the United Nations, as do States Parties or parent political
bodies for various other courts. Several criminal judges noted that their courts
sometimes feel inappropriate pressure from their executives to complete trials
in the shortest time possible, regardless of concerns for due process. Another
criminal judge questioned the independence of his own court, due to its
financial dependence on certain donor states. "When our president or
prosecutor has traveled to all capitals to beg for money, will their answer
depend on the issuance of an indictment and its content?" he wondered aloud.
The entities holding a court's purse strings, in other words, may act as another
kind of executive power, one that may overstep its role.
These comments suggest that the freedom to exercise the judicial function
as judges see fit, along with guarantees of independence for prosecutors and
other organs of their institutions from outside entities, are critical parts of what
participants see as the rule of law in the international sphere. Their concerns
about interference and influence by external forces recalled discussions that
have taken place during past sessions of the BIIJ in relation to the politicization
of international justice.'
There are other differences between the domestic and international rule of
law, in addition to those related to the separation of powers. The international
rule of law, for example, must deal with issues not found at the domestic level,
such as interstate trade, warfare, and territorial disputes, pointed out one judge.
The "content" of the international rule of law is also less clear than that of the
rule of law at the level of a single state. One judge suggested that it is important
that the basis of the international rule of law represent "the lowest common
denominator," that is, just those essential values that can be shared by
7. As one of the session readings noted, "[tlhe absence of an international legislature makes law-making
a little cumbersome and time-consuming, but that is an inevitable consequence of sovereignty." Cf Justice
Richard Goldstone, Inaugural Address at the Salzburg Global Seminar: The Rule of Law: Indispensable
Prerequisite for Democracy 7 (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.salzburgglobal.org/current/news.
cfm?IDMedia=51481.
8. See BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT'L JUDGES, BRANDEIS UNIV., INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
THE DELICATE BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (2007) [hereinafter 2007 BIIJ REPORT], available at
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs /internationaljusticelbiij/BLlJ2007.pdf; see also BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT'L
JUDGES, BRANDEIS UNIV., INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2009) [hereinafter 2009
BIl REPORT], available at http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2009.pdf.
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populations across the globe. Attitudes toward the death penalty provide an
interesting case in point. A number of states resist its prohibition by
international law, although some have been forced to acquiesce through their
membership in a regional entity with its own human rights convention.
Participants wondered about the role of the international community in
imposing such a ban across the globe, given that many states still view the
death penalty as an appropriate punishment in some circumstances. One judge
pointed out that while it is important that the international rule of law have
substance, this does not mean that all substantive issues should be included
under its protective rubric. This runs counter to the increasing tendency,
described by another participant, to view the rule of law as "embodying all
good things."
Very importantly, it was observed that international law has evolved
considerably beyond the traditional "law of nations" to encompass norms
applicable directly to individuals. Indeed, the international protection of human
rights has served to unify formerly discrete spheres of law, as national courts
become active interpreters and enforcers of the individual rights enumerated in
various international conventions.'0 There is clearly, one judge declared, a
"synergistic relationship" between the rule of law at the domestic and
international levels.
This nexus of issues pertaining to the rule of law-procedural versus
substantive, domestic versus international, and state-focused versus individual-
focused-are subtly interconnected. Judge Hisashi Owada sought to clarify
these relationships in a 2009 article in which he described the evolution that
international law has undergone over the past decades." The increasingly
prominent place of human rights in the international legal order has brought
with it a shift of focus from the state to the individual as a subject of
international law, as well as a new emphasis on a rule of law that transcends
national boundaries. He writes that "these developments place further legal
constraints on the conduct of sovereign states in the international community;
they also prescribe international norms to guarantee an international standard of
justice that is substantive in character, stretching the rule of law beyond its
narrower, more formalistic aspects."' 2 The international rule of law can only
achieve its objectives, he asserts, if it incorporates "certain basic universal
values" as well as "traditional formal aspects, such as the supremacy of the law,
equality before the law, and the existence of independent monitoring
systems."'3
9. This is the situation with the Russian Federation and the Council of Europe.
10. BINGHAM, supra note 3,at 117.
11. Owada, supra note 4, at 187.
12. Id. at 195.
13. Id. at 196.
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These discussions about the nature of the international rule of law set the
stage for BIlJ 2010 participants to address a number of related topics in the
following sessions. Despite some variation in personal interpretations of the term,
it was clear that all participants are engaged, through their judicial work and
institution building, in the progressive development and recognition of a rule of
law that can establish desirable legal norms and practices across the globe.
14. Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur. [OSCE], Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (June 29, 1990), available at http://www.osce.org/
odihr/elections/14304.
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Fairness in International Judicial Institutions
The notion of "fairness" is central to the rule of law. It underlies, among
other principles, the equality of all persons before the law, various elements of
due process, and the basic tenets of democratic governance. BIIJ participants had
the opportunity to explore the degree to which it is the role of international
judicial institutions to make the content and application of international law
fairer.
The rapid multiplication of international organizations endowed with rule-
making authority in the aftermath of the Second World War has spurred the
development of the substance of international law. These substantive
developments were often not matched, however, with adequate means of
implementation. For many decades, the interpretation of international law was
thus frequently left to the discretion of states. In the last twenty years, the
unprecedented increase in the number of international courts and tribunals has
finally equipped the international community with multiple judicial fora, which
are designed to provide objective determinations of that law. This phenomenon
has, in and of itself, significantly contributed to increasing the inherent fairness
of international law, as well as the fairness of its application.
While international courts may further enhance the inherent fairness of the
law by interpreting international law in conformity with universal human rights
principles, as acknowledged in the opening discussion, this session was centered
on the role and responsibilities of international courts in increasing the fairness of
their institutions and procedures. Specifically, this session examined two aspects
of fairness that cut across the operations of international courts and tribunals: 1)
the fairness of their proceedings, and 2) the transparency of their work.
With regard to proceedings in international courts and tribunals, the
questions posed to the judges were the following: Do courts have sufficient
control over the conduct of their proceedings in order to ensure fairness? How
much discretion do courts have in adopting rules that fill gaps or can ensure more
fairness to the proceedings? Should judges have the power to modify rules they
believe to be unfair?
Before responding to these questions, a number of participants raised
preliminary queries about the subject at hand. Asked one judge, is the very notion
of fairness unavoidably subjective? If so, how should we approach it? When
speaking of fairness, suggested a participant, is it not necessary to specify in
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relation to whom? The fairness of proceedings could be evaluated differently by
parties before the court (states, prosecutors, or individuals), witnesses, victims,
parent political bodies, the general public, or any other stakeholder. Finally, it
was pointed out that the focal point of fairness might differ according to the type
of court under examination. While fairness in proceedings in general applies in
all courts and to all parties, fairness to the accused, for example, may be a
dominant concern in international criminal tribunals, whereas fairness toward
victims of state violations may command more attention in international human
rights courts.
Participants noted that even detailed rules might not cover all questions
related to fairness in a given situation before a court. This means that judges are
often left to resolve any uncertainties, although how this is done varies widely
from court to court. Some courts benefit from a wide margin of discretion when
amending their procedural rules. The ICJ, for instance, although relatively
conservative in its approach toward changes in procedure, has had occasion to
revise both the rules and practices of the court in order to improve efficiency and
fairness.'" The experience of the ACHPR is interesting as it is a young court-its
first judges were elected in 2006-and has only recently finalized its rules of
procedure. African judges did not consult the court's parent body, the African
Union, during this initial process. "My experience is that judges are sovereign in
this issue and should adopt the rules they feel are correct," said one participant.
However, when the rules were revised, the court was advised to open up the
process to input by NGOs, and the African Commission of Human and Peoples'
Rights was also consulted. 16 This feedback was found to be informative, although
the court retained complete autonomy in deciding the final version of the rules.
Judges of the ICTY and ICTR similarly have the authority to revise their
institutions' rules of procedure and, more surprisingly, their rules of evidence.
Indeed, since the ICTY was established in 1993, the rules of procedure and
evidence have been revised, according to one participant, forty-five times, albeit
not without some critical commentary on the part of observers. ICTY and ICTR
judges should acknowledge, said one participant, this special privilege they have
and take care not to abuse it. Another participant described his reaction to this
practice: "I felt that the ICTY followed an excessive practice of amending its
rules of procedure. Then I realized I was wrong. The ability of judges to
15. The ICJ revised its Rules of Court in 1978, which were subsequently amended in 2005. The ICJ
further adopted Practice Directions in 2001, which were amended in 2009.
16. It was noted that the relationship of the African Court and the African Commission is not well
articulated in the protocol establishing the former-it simply says that the work of the Court should
"complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights."
Consequently, ACHPR judges must also take the lead in determining what this provision means in concrete
terms. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court
on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 2 (June 9, 1998), OAU doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III)
[hereinafter ACHPR] (adopted on June 10, 1998 and entered into force on Jan. 25, 2004).
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transform practical lessons into modified rules is extremely important to the
efficiency of the court." Many believe that newer international criminal courts
and tribunals have been able to learn from the "trial and error" experiences of the
so-called "ad hoc tribunals," and devise rules of procedure and evidence from the
beginning that have required less tweaking as their work progressed.
Courts with unique procedural elements, however, cannot benefit from the
past experience of peer institutions. The ECCC, for example, has made provision
for victims to participate as civil parties in its trials, and it has found little
precedent to follow on this matter. The ICC is the only other court that could
provide relevant jurisprudence, but its victim participation regime is statutorily
different from that of the ECCC. In response to the enormous increase in the
number of civil parties wishing to participate in the Cambodian Court's second
case-undoubtedly through public observation of its first case-ECCC judges
had to amend the rules of victim participation to apply to the second case and
beyond. In the long run, declared a participant, constantly amending rules
between cases would not be an optimal strategy.
The ICC contrasts with many other international courts in the restrictions that
have been placed upon its judges in the area of rules revision. It happened that a
number of 2010 BIIJ participants had been in attendance at the 1998 conference
in Rome where the ICC treaty was negotiated.17 It was clear, they said, that
measures were actively taken during the conference to limit the power of the
ICC, and especially its judges. Another participant observed that the process that
established the ICC was "highly politicized," with the result that "the Rome
Statute is full of safeguard clauses to ensure that the Court would not be too big
of a threat to the sovereignty of states." In addition to the statute of the Court that
was created by treaty among states, the rules of procedure and evidence were
promulgated by the Assembly of States Parties ("ASP"). Consequently, the ASP
holds the "unusual power" to change the rules of the court; the judges can only
propose changes. This regulation, said one participant, is both "restrictive and
cumbersome." The judges, however, do have the authority to adopt regulations of
the court.
The recent Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the ICC seemed to
mark a changing attitude toward the court, however." "I think that in the
17. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/
rome/proceedings/contents.htm.
18. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court describes the Review Conference, which took
place in Kampala, Uganda from May 31-June 11, 2010, thus:
ICC states parties, observer states, international organizations, NGOs, and other participants
discussed proposed amendments to the Rome Statute and took stock of its impact to date, making the
Conference a critical milestone in the evolution of the Rome system. More than 600 Coalition
members played a central role in enhancing the dialogue on the Rome system and ensured that the
voices of civil society were truly heard through a number of debates, roundtables and other events.
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international atmosphere, there is much more confidence that the ICC is not a
loose cannon," observed a criminal judge. "There is a real chance that States
Parties might be willing to give judges the power they should have."
The discussion of control over a court's rules of procedures ended with a
reflection about why there are such contrasting views on the appropriate role for
judges in their drafting and revision. Might these views reflect the different legal
cultures associated with the civil and common law systems, a participant
queried? If so, this tension between civil and common law practices can be found
in other aspects of the work of international courts and tribunals. For example,
international judges may bring to their work certain assumptions, inculcated
through their legal education and practice, about methods for witness preparation,
the appropriateness of ex parte communication, or the relative importance of
written submissions and oral pleadings.' 9
BIIJ participants then turned their attention to the transparency of the work
of their institutions and how it affects their perceived fairness by a number of
different stakeholders, including parties before the court, the general public and
parent political bodies. It would be difficult to argue against the desirability of
international courts being transparent in the way they operate. These
institutions require broad understanding and support for their success and
impact, and having their proceedings and oral hearings accessible to the public,
and open to scrutiny, would seem the best way to achieve this goal. It would
certainly be difficult for anybody to trust a completely secret judicial
proceeding. Transparency thus necessarily fosters public confidence in the fair
administration of justice.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that a level of confidentiality may
sometimes be warranted in international courts and tribunals. In criminal
proceedings, the identities of witnesses may need to be hidden in order to ensure
their safety. And in interstate dispute cases, parties may not wish to reveal
sensitive state information in presenting their cases and thus might opt for the
submission of redacted documents. Such circumstances require that the right
balance be struck between transparency and confidentiality.
The following question was accordingly put to BIIJ participants: What
measures do your respective institutions take to ensure the optimal level of
transparency? The ensuing discussion highlighted the various ways in which
different courts and tribunals attempt to keep their work in the eyes of the public,
Delivering on the Promise of a Fair, Effective and Independent Court: Review Conference of the Rome Statute,
COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
19. See also BRANDEIS INST. FOR INT'L JUDGES, BRANDEIS UNIV., COMPLEMENTARITY AND
COOPERATION: INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN A DIVERSE WORLD (2006) [hereinafter 2006 BIIJ REPORT],
available at http:/www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/intemationaljustice/biij/BIW2006.pdf. Cf DANIEL TERRIS,
CESARE P. R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND
WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD'S CASES (2007).
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but it also brought to light a number of concerns judges have about the interface
between their institutions and the public.
With regard to the transparency of hearings, it was noted that interstate
courts generally allow judges or the parties themselves to decide whether the
oral proceedings should be confidential. 20 In other courts, like the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ"), human rights courts and international criminal courts,
it is incumbent upon the courts-and not the parties-to decide if the hearings
should be confidential, and, as a general rule, the public will be denied
admission only in "exceptional circumstances" or if there are "serious reasons"
to prevent attendance."' A judge asked, does the public really have an interest in
open oral hearings of proceedings involving only states? Some participants
were inclined to think that the general public does have a democratic interest in
knowing how their national state argues cases before international courts.
The WTO Appellate Body, at the request of parties, recently decided to open
up its appellate hearings to the public in certain cases. 2  There was initial
resistance by some member states to make their arguments in public, as well as
some trepidation about the loss of confidentiality. The biggest concern, however,
was that the diplomatic negotiation of dispute settlement that had historically
been part of proceedings under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the
predecessor to the WTO) could not be done successfully in public.23 But both the
Appellate Body and many WTO members have since recognized the benefits that
come with transparency-better understanding of the Body's decisions by the
public, and greater participation in the process of reaching it. The result is that
20. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 46, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 ("The
hearing in Court shall be public, unless the Court shall decide otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the
public be not admitted."); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 26(2), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 561 ("The hearing shall be public, unless the Tribunal decides otherwise or unless the parties
demand that the public be not admitted.").
21. See, e.g., Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2010 O.J.
(C 85) 31 (Mar. 30, 2010) ("The hearing in court shall be public, unless the Court of Justice, of its own motion
or on application by the parties, decides otherwise for serious reasons."); see also RULES OF COURT OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR), R. 63(1) (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/
rdonlyres/DlEB31A8-4194-436E-987E-65AC8864BE4F/O/RulesOfCourt.pdf ("Hearings shall be public unless
... the Chamber in exceptional circumstances decides otherwise, either of its own motion or at the request of a
party or any other person concerned."); Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights art. 24(1),
O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88 (1979) ("The hearings shall be
public, unless the Court, in exceptional circumstances, decides otherwise."); Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, R. 78-79, U.N. Doc. 1T/32/REV.7 (2009),
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules-procedure-evidence/IT032Rev45_en.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2009, WT/AB/13 (Feb. 17, 2010). In 2009, the number
of individuals who registered to observe the oral hearing was thirty-three in Appellate Body, U.S.-Continued
Zeroing, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 19, 2009); thirty-seven in Appellate Body, U.S.-Zeroing (EC) (Article 21.5-
EC), WT/DS294/AB/RW (June 11, 2009); thirty-six in Appellate Body, U.S.-Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5-
Japan), WT/DS322/AB/RW (Aug. 31, 2009). See also Appellate Body, Annual Report for 2008, WT/AB/11
(Feb. 9, 2009).
23. Cf Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Individuals and Non-State Entities before International Courts and
Tribunals, 5 Max Planck U.N.Y.B. L. 53 (2001).
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there are now fewer objections to opening up hearings when requested by the
parties.
As a human rights court, the ECHR has had to find a delicate balance
between transparency and privacy. On the one hand, it has made an impressive
effort to publicize its proceedings by broadcasting them via the Internet. This
has allowed populations in countries across the Council of Europe to follow and
understand cases with important implications for the protection of the rights
guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights.24 If applicants ask to
remain anonymous, the Court may decide that their case be referred to using
only initials.25 When two parties decide to settle their dispute, the negotiations
are also kept strictly private; a breach of confidentiality may result in the Court
rejecting the case altogether.
While transparency is important in all international courts, it is perhaps
particularly so in criminal tribunals where individuals are accused of heinous
crimes. The media scrutinize such trials closely, as do victim communities and
NGOs. The rapid dissemination of information means that unfavorable
commentary about the proceedings can quickly "go viral." The ECCC, which
was just releasing its first judgment at the time of BIIJ 2010, has come under
harsh criticism for not being transparent enough. The Court operates under both
international and Cambodian law, and the latter calls for confidential
investigations and limited disclosures. However, the NGOs that observe ECCC
proceedings want to ensure that it is in compliance with internationally
recognized standards of due process. The prosecutors have accordingly
disclosed some information and made certain documents public, but it has not
been enough to satisfy these NGOs. Some criminal judges at the Institute
characterized their courts as much more open. If information needs to be
classified for reasons of safety or discretion, it is usually done so temporarily.
"Parties may have their own approaches to confidentiality," commented one
participant. "But in the interests of the public and transparency, judges may
override their decision."
Transparency might also have a direct effect on the behavior of judges. One
participant suggested that open proceedings are an "important safeguard," not
only for their fairness but also for the independence and impartiality of the bench.
If judges know that they are being observed, he suggested, they may behave
differently than if all proceedings took place without external scrutiny. In an
article, one of the 2010 BIIJ participants, Theodor Meron, quoted Lord Cullen as
saying that "not being hidden from the public ear and eye is a safeguard against
24. Formally known as The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
it was adopted on Nov. 4, 1950, and entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953. Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
25. E.g., A., B., and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, 2032 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).
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judicial arbitrariness."26 On the other hand, it could be argued that judges in high-
profile trials might be better able to carry out their role without the pressure or
interference that can come with an open courtroom.
While transparency might seem an ideal to strive for in most circumstances,
participants agreed that this cannot extend to judicial deliberations. These should
be strictly confidential, although publicizing dissenting and separate opinions
might shed light on this important part of the judicial process and help the public
to understand how judges have arrived at their decisions.
Finally, it was noted that the practice of producing annual reports may
enhance the transparency of the work of international courts and tribunals to the
benefit of numerous actors, such as parent political bodies, parties (states,
prosecutors, and individuals), the general public and other stakeholders. Even
those institutions that are not required to do so will often summarize the work
they have accomplished in such a publication. These publications generally
include statistics as well as a sophisticated narrative, in contrast to reports
produced by some national courts where there appears to be a reluctance to
provide any information to political bodies beyond statistical data. Reports
written and circulated by international judicial institutions generally serve the
purpose of explaining their work to those who do not necessarily have legal
expertise. They also serve to entice more support.
In addition, the presidents of many courts make annual addresses to parent
political bodies, such as the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Security Council,
the Assembly of States Parties ("ICC"), and the Meeting of States Parties
("ITLOS"). While this represents yet another channel through which the courts
can increase the transparency of their work, it is also an exercise that carries
risks, given the highly politicized context in which the addresses are delivered.
In concluding the discussion about transparency, one participant adopted the
perspective of "an outsider looking in." Striking the appropriate balance in
judicial proceedings between openness and confidentiality may be "intuitive" for
judges. But laypersons may not understand the reasoning behind a certain
decision to protect identities or withhold information. In order to promote their
reputations as fair institutions, encourage compliance with their judgments, and
optimize their impact on constituencies, international courts should make sure
that they communicate their actions and decisions effectively to the broadest
public possible.
This comment led naturally into a discussion about the role of media in the
outreach efforts of international judicial institutions. Several participants noted
that journalists are rarely trained to report on international judicial proceedings
and frequently fail to present these proceedings accurately or in a balanced way.
26. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment: Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International
Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 360 (2005).
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The result is that the public may not perceive the proceedings of international
courts and tribunals as fair.
One judge noted, in fact, that on the very day he traveled to BIIJ 2010, he
read an editorial in a local paper calling for the closure of his court. "At the same
time that we are struggling to survive and asking for help," said the judge in
frustration, "here comes someone who, due to a lack of knowledge of basic
issues relating to the court's existence, says 'Close it down!"' The failure of the
press to understand the court's central objective of ending impunity, and
insistence on the institution's "unfair" use of resources, could, he suggested, have
a detrimental effect on his institution's legacy.
Another participant cautioned, however, that a distinction must be made
between partisanship and ignorance on the part of the press. Criminal courts, in
particular, may become the target of criticism by communities that do not agree
with the basic assumptions behind their mandates. Occasional negative press may
not help an international court's cause, he continued, but it is crucial that their
work be kept in the public eye despite the potential dangers.
Participants then addressed a perennial question with regard to judges:
should they explain their rulings so that the public understands the reasoning
behind them, or should they let their judgments "speak for themselves"? There
were mixed views about this matter. Some participants felt that under no
circumstances should members of a bench ever explain their rulings, even if it is
to rectify a misunderstanding created by the media. Others were not against the
practice in principle, although they recognized that, as one judge said, "it is hard
to express legal arguments in a way that is palatable to a media organization."
Most international courts have resolved this issue by tasking certain staff
with the preparation of information for the public. "You need within the
institution a special type of communicator," explained a participant, "who must
be a lawyer and who must at the same time know about public relations and press
work." At the CCJ, for example, this role is carried out by an administrative unit
that prepares a summary of judgments, approved by the judges before their
release to the media. The WTO has taken similar steps, clearly recognizing that it
is unrealistic to expect the media to digest immediately a 250-page decision and
report on it adequately. The organization ensures that short summaries of the key
arguments of the parties, and decisions of the panels and the Appellate Body, are
issued at the time the decisions are circulated, and that its website contains
concise summaries of the procedural status and substantive decisions in every
case. Criminal courts may find themselves the object of particularly heightened
media attention when decisions are announced. "Our trials last two or three years,
with judgments that run into the hundreds of pages," explained a criminal judge.
"So the presiding judge will read a summary of the judgment, making clear that it
does not replace the judgment, which is the only authoritative version of the trial
chamber decision. But the summary can be used by the media and others."
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Communication may be of particular importance for the IACHR, where the
dissemination of judgments is sometimes part of the reparation measures called
for in a decision. But printing long judgments in their entirety in local
newspapers is not an effective way to communicate the content of important
decisions, pointed out a judge. Consequently, the court "is now in the process of
developing summaries, prepared by the secretary of the court, as well as
providing a way to work with TV and radio so they can really reach the public."
Several participants pointed out that the onus should not only be on courts to
communicate well but also on journalists to report well. There should be
journalists trained in reporting on international justice issues, ones who "have
enough understanding of the complexities of international courts to put their
work into perspective and communicate it properly," one participant declared.
Some others agreed that such journalists seem to be in short supply, the result
being that international courts and tribunals do not always have the reputations
they deserve as fair and just institutions.
Finally, participants were urged to consider with utmost care the actual and
perceived fairness of their judicial operations, given that it is an important
building block for the establishment of an international rule of law. As the late
Thomas M. Franck stated, "International law, even more than any individual
state's legal system, needs [fairness as an] element of promotion of voluntary
compliance because of the relative paucity of modes of compulsion. ' 7 While
international judges, like any other judges, are primarily bound to apply the law,
the inherent fairness of that law, as well as the fairness of its application,
necessarily play an important part in maximizing the impact of international
justice.
The Accessibility of International Courts and Tribunals
Through exploring the notion of fairness in international justice proceedings,
BIIJ participants began the process of developing their definition of the
international rule of law. They next addressed an area of increasing focus in the
international justice system, that of how accessibility to international courts and
tribunals is structured and whether increased access can serve as one of the
indices of a robust international rule of law.
Participants began their discussion by recognizing the dramatic shifts that
have occurred in the types of actors that participate in international justice
proceedings. It was noted in the first session that international law has evolved
from a system focused on states to one that increasingly involves individuals and
27. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1995). Franck was
the Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus at New York University School of Law. Over his long
academic career, he also, among numerous other activities, served as an ad hoc judge at the ICJ and acted as a
session leader at BII 2004.
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non-state entities. Indeed, this development "mirrors an increased participation of
private or non-state actors in many other fields of international life," commented
a participant. Most of the international judicial institutions established over the
past two decades highlight this new focus-criminal tribunals have the individual
as their subject, while human rights courts respond to claims by individuals or the
organizations representing them. They thus stand in contrast to courts that
address disputes between states, which are the "traditional" subjects of
international law.
But even interstate dispute resolution bodies increasingly deal with the
concerns of individuals and non-state entities, if only indirectly. It was pointed
out that the ICJ cases addressing alleged violations of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations by the United States-the Breard, LaGrand, and Avena
cases-were brought by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico respectively on behalf
of their nationals awaiting execution in U.S. prisons. 28 The WTO Appellate Body
and ITLOS similarly take on cases where a state essentially stands in for the
interests of an individual, a commercial body, or other entity. Interestingly, one
participant pointed out that the converse also exists. The ECHR occasionally
receives "disguised state applications," when hundreds of individual applicants of
the same nationality make a claim against a foreign state.
Participants were asked to consider the ways in which access to their
institutions-either direct or indirect-has developed over the years. They also
had the opportunity to point out both the advantages and challenges that come
with these new patterns of access. Their responses illustrated that international
courts and tribunals face many common issues as they seek to adapt to changes
in the way their institutions function.
Interstate dispute judges began with reflections on their own type of
institutions, those where access is usually limited to states. At the WTO, "to get
in the door, a government has to bring the case." However, many governments
will agree to bring cases when commercial entities based in their countries ask
for a legal determination on trade measures they can show are disadvantageous.
ITLOS has gone further by formally extending its jurisdiction to include non-
state actors in cases before its Seabed Chamber. In disputes between states over
deep-sea mining issues, the private contractors involved must submit to the
Chamber's jurisdiction or to binding arbitration. In situations where a vessel is
seized on the high seas, the flag state and shipping company also frequently join
forces when bringing a case before the tribunal.
The agreement that established the CCJ in 2001, and the interstate treaty
that the court is required to interpret, provide for even more permissive access.
28. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisonal Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258
(Apr. 9); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Max.
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31). Cf Linda E. Carter, Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and
Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 15 DuKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 259 (2005).
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They allow private entities to initiate a suit against a state provided they first
seek the permission of their home state. The latter can then permit the private
entity to proceed to sue, or it could itself institute the action, essentially then
becoming the claimant." Caribbean judges had to grapple with the complexities
of this provision when a private entity sought to sue its own state, whose
government naturally denied the entity permission, saying that it (the state)
could not simultaneously act as a claimant and defendant. When the private
entity approached the court directly, the state in question resisted the suit,
arguing that the entity could not prosecute the action in the face of its own
state's refusal to grant permission to sue. After looking at various articles of the
treaty, the CCJ judges decided that the private entity should be allowed to
pursue the suit in order to avoid a violation of another provision of the treaty
regarding non-discrimination. 0 The court held that, 1) to deny standing to
private entities in such circumstances could have the effect of frustrating the
goals of the treaty, and 2) the purpose of the relevant article was to avoid a
duplication of suits, and that the requirement to seek permission was a
procedural device to avoid a state allegedly in violation of the treaty being twice
vexed, once by an injured private entity, and again by the contracting party of
that private entity. The oldest international court, the ICJ, continues to retain its
status as a state-only forum, while acknowledging that many of its cases have
the interests of non-state entities behind them. In certain situations, however, the
definition of "state" may not always be clear. The Court was once called upon to
decide whether a "super-state"-the European Community-fell under its
jurisdiction and concluded that it did not. There has also been some discussion
about whether individuals should have full access to the Court to bring a case.
Indeed, former ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins "has convincingly explained that
there are powerful reasons for amending the Statute to allow for this
development."'" However, not all judges agree on the wisdom of opening up
historically "state-only courts" to non-state action. One judge even characterized
himself as an outright "opponent" to such a move, given that there are already
other judicial fora where individuals can be direct parties to a case.
Human rights courts offer a very different picture from interstate dispute
courts when it comes to the role of the individual. Their mandate is to determine
whether there have been violations of the individual human rights set out by the
respective conventions that each court was created to uphold-namely, the
European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human
29. See Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, art. XXIV, Feb. 14, 2001, U.N.T.S.
2255; see also Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, art. 222, Jan. 1, 2006.
30. See Trinidad Cement Ltd. v. Guyana, App. No. OA 2/2009, (2009] CCJ 1 (OJ).
31. Vicufla, supra note 23, at 57.
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Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights." The status of
the individual is thus central to their work.
However, access to these courts is not necessarily direct for individual
claimants. Only the ECHR accepts, without condition, individual petitions
alleging human rights violations, a policy that has opened its doors to
thousands of applications from across the Council of Europe every year and
created a backlog of over 145,000 cases as of February 201 L"3 Unlike its sister
human rights courts in the Americas and Africa, the European Court no longer
has a commission-it was abolished by Protocol 11 to the Convention,
according to which the ECHR became a full-time institution in 1998. 34 The
result is that it has no body to "filter" the massive number of applications, an
overwhelming percentage of which will eventually be found to be inadmissible
on various grounds. The ECHR is constantly seeking strategies to streamline its
approach to admissibility review so that the court can operate more efficiently
and prioritize cases that involve the most serious human rights violations and
have important implications for the promotion and protection of human rights
across Europe.
In contrast, individuals do not have direct access to the IACHR. Its cases
must be referred by either the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-
which does accept individual petitions alleging violations-or a state party to
the Organization of American States. However, it is almost automatic for the
Commission to refer cases when it has found a violation, so that individuals
have reliable indirect access to the Court. Furthermore, victims have the right
to participate in a proceeding at the IACHR, with a status akin to being a party.
Occasionally, states have requested an advisory opinion from the IACHR in
hopes of appealing an unfavorable decision by the Inter-American
Commission. For example, Argentina and Uruguay requested in 1990 a general
appeal of a Commission decision regarding the disappearance of political
opposition figures. The Court found that the admissibility requirements for this
appeal had not been met. More generally, it has never fully reversed a decision
of the Commission, although it has arrived at different findings.
The ACHPR shares characteristics with both of these courts-it accepts
applications from states and also from individuals, but only if the defendant
state has accepted the jurisdiction of the court to receive individual cases.3 5 So
32. ECHR, supra note 24; see African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58; see also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
33. Statistics ]/].31/8/2011, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ NR/rdonlyres/7B68F865-
2B15-4DFC-85E5-DEDD8C160AC1/0/Statistics201 l.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
34. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol
No. 11, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.coe.intTrreaty/EN/Treaties/
html/155.htm.
35. The first case of the African Court, Michelot Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal (Dec. 15, 2009),
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far, only four countries out of fifty-three members of the African Union have
done so. However, individuals do have direct access to both the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights-which can only issue
recommendations, not binding decisions, and thus is less attractive to
claimants-and to regional courts that have jurisdiction over human rights
issues.36 Nonetheless, ACHPR judges are anxious to open up direct access to
their court and are working toward this goal, despite the opposition of most
African states.
A final question about access to human rights courts was raised. Given the
broad geographic jurisdictions of all the human rights courts, it may be a real
challenge for some victims and claimants to reach the actual court and pursue
their cases in person. The Inter-American system has made provision for this
challenge, having created funds to help both the Commission and Court cover
the cost of participation in proceedings.
Of all the types of international courts and tribunals, those with criminal
jurisdictions are most closely associated with individuals, that is, the persons
who stand accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.
However, there is another category of individual becoming increasingly
important in the proceedings of international criminal tribunals: the victim. BIIJ
2010 hosted judges from six different criminal institutions, and all had
experiences to share about how and when victims may access their
proceedings.
The discussion started with the ICC, the first court to make specific
provision for the participation of the victim in trials (see infra Article 68(3) of
the Rome Statute). This has been hailed as a positive development in
international criminal justice by many observers, and most judges agreed that it
was a worthwhile development. But it was also acknowledged that the
modalities of participation are still being explored and that a truly workable
model for victim participation has yet to be devised.
was ultimately deemed inadmissible since Senegal had not accepted jurisdiction over cases initiated by
individuals. Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal, App. No. 001/2008, Afr. Ct. on Hum. & Peoples' Rts.,
Judgment (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.african-court.org/fileadmin/documents/Court/Latest-
Judgments/English/JUDGMENTMICHELOTYOGOGOMBAYEVS._REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL_1.pdf.
36. An example is the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of the West African States
(ECOWAS). ECON. COMMUNITY W. AFR. STS., http://www.ecowas.int/ (last updated June 8, 2011).
37. Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 68(3).
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Several "deficits" in the system were pointed out. For example, many victims
are represented by just a few counsel, so that the ideal scenario-that victims
personally come to the ICC and, as one participant described it, "see that the
perpetrator is investigated and prosecuted so that they might restore their
lives"-is far from a reality. Furthermore, it is unclear how much the counsel,
whose services are paid by the court itself, communicate with the victims, solicit
their views, and so on. In the cases currently underway, the victims of the crimes
are in Africa, thousands of miles away from The Hague. Victim participation also
has implications for the functioning of the ICC itself. "I am troubled by the time
that ICC judges spend on this issue," commented a judge from another court. "It
slows down the procedures. As a human rights expert, I am all in favor of
tribunals with strong victim representation. But there needs to be much stronger
and better management of court proceedings." These challenges notwithstanding,
the role played by victims' counsel in ongoing ICC trials serves to remind the
world that international criminal justice is not just about convictions, sentencing,
and the development of a new body of law. It is also about providing reparations
and healing to those who suffered from the crimes in question.
The ECCC also provides for the participation of victims, allowing them
access to case files as well as the right to submit evidence, question witnesses and
the accused, and appeal. Unlike at the ICC, however, victims cannot be awarded
monetary compensation, but instead "moral and collective reparations." The Court
currently finds itself overwhelmed, however, by the increasing popularity of
victim participation. For the ECCC's first case, there were 100 civil parties. For
the second, 4000 civil parties had registered as of July 2010. "How can we
appropriately manage this huge number, while trying to hear their voices in an
efficient and meaningful manner?" asked a participant. "I don't think we have
established the best practice with the Court, but we are trying to improve the
system to have satisfactory victim participation."
The newest international criminal tribunal, the STL, also allows the input of
victims: it permits them to cross-examine witnesses, to report on the personal
impact of the crimes under investigation, and provides them access to the
documents filed by the parties. However, the pre-trial judge must consider their
participation as necessary to the proceedings in order for it to be authorized. This
criterion was established, at least partly, "to avoid the problems faced by the
ICC.",
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The other criminal tribunals represented at the BIIJ-the ICTY, ICTR, and
SCSL-do not have specific provisions for victim participation. Nonetheless, as
one criminal judge pointed out, "We may not have victim representation but we
face them every day." That is, victims participate as witnesses, which is what
another criminal judge considered to be their only appropriate role. "More than
1000 victims have been heard as witnesses in my tribunal. They have a clear and
important role-to tell their stories. But at the ICC, is it clear what it means for a
victim to participate?" It is also uncertain, he added, whether the NGOs
advocating for victim participation actually have the same agenda as those they
purport to represent. A third judge was disappointed that, while there had been a
great outcry for victims to participate at his court, it was not acted upon. What
exists instead is a small number of perpetrators brought to trial and thousands of
victims who feel frustrated.
Having access to international courts does not always mean, however, being
a party to a case. Access may also come in the form of providing information
relevant to a case. This usually happens through the submission of amicus curiae
briefs from NGOs and other bodies interested in the outcome of proceedings.
The admissibility of amicus briefs has been a subject of debate in a number of
institutions, and at the WTO it was especially controversial. Because the WTO
rules do not directly address the question, the Appellate Body determined that
amicus briefs could be accepted under the general authority for panels to seek
information from any relevant source. While many NGOs, particularly those
working in the environmental and food safety areas, welcomed this ruling, many
WTO members do not approve of a role for non-parties in dispute settlement
proceedings. In practice, amicus curiae submissions are frequently filed as
attachments to the submission of a party, in which case the Appellate Body
considers such material to be an integral part of the submission of that
participant. Unsolicited amicus curiae briefs, on the other hand, are not required
to be accepted but may be considered where deemed pertinent and useful. Other
interstate dispute courts, like the ICJ, do not accept amicus briefs at all. The
CCJ, as of 2010, had not yet been faced with this challenge.
As for the role of amicus curiae briefs in human rights courts, there seems to
be little debate about the importance of these additional sources of information.
At the ECHR, amicus briefs-called "third party interventions"-are unsolicited
but usually accepted, and the IACHR similarly accepts them. In the African
system, a provision has been made to allow amicus briefs but, given that the
Court had only had one inadmissible case as of BIIJ 2010, it had not yet been
put to the test.
Finally, views on amicus curiae access to international criminal courts and
tribunals were mixed. The SCSL allows amicus briefs and finds them very
effective. At the ICC, amicus briefs are allowed at the discretion of judges. One
participant commented that judges should be careful and selective in what they
accept, so as to verify that the brief makes a substantive contribution and is not
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merely "an application where an organization wants to enhance its profile by
appealing to an international court." Other judges noted that at their courts, they
already have a plethora of information and do not accept any more from outside
sources.
While most BIIJ participants agreed that increased access to international
courts is, overall, a positive change, there were a number of concerns expressed
about potential associated dangers. If increased access is going to benefit
everyone equally, it was suggested, there needs to be more education about who
has the right to approach an international court, and more provision of legal
assistance to individuals who want to pursue a claim. This is especially pertinent
for the developing world. Increased access to international judicial fora might
also lead to abuse, cautioned another judge, with individuals pursuing
simultaneous litigation of the same case in multiple venues.
One participant mentioned the pressing need to define the borderline
between the responsibilities of international and domestic adjudication.
Increased participation by individuals in international human rights courts, in
particular, may become a justification for states not to exercise proper
jurisdiction or ensure the rule of law domestically. "It is undesirable that the role
of ensuring the rule of law shift to the international level," he declared, "when it
is the primary responsibility of states in their own jurisdictions."
The most vigorous warnings related to increased access were about the
potential dangers of victim participation. While in principle a positive
development, victim participation, if not managed properly, could compromise
the fair trial rights of the accused. There are already concerns that defense
counsel in criminal tribunals operate at a disadvantage, financial and otherwise,
in relation to the prosecution. Does the counsel for victims become a kind of
second prosecution, acting to strengthen the case against the accused? Does
victim participation further slow down criminal proceedings that already move
at a ponderous pace? Does consideration of victims' needs complicate the
already challenging work of international judges? These are questions that need
to be considered as international criminal procedure evolves.
In the end, it was acknowledged by participants that the shift from a
paradigm of state agreement to one of individual rights is an important transition
for international law, and access is an important part of this new paradigm. "It is
crucial that the person concerned by the law can participate in its development,"
said one judge. Another concurred that "the increasing involvement of
individuals in international tribunals has become an essential element in
enhancing the rule of law at an international level. However," he continued, "if
the number of individual complaints reaches such a level that the court in
question can only handle them with great difficulty, then the system becomes to
a certain extent self-defeating." In other words, balance is crucial if increased
access to international courts and tribunals is to strengthen the international rule
of law.
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The Impact of International Justice
The idea of an international rule of law embodies many lofty principles and
goals. It is clear, however, that without their real-world implementation, the
notion remains empty. BIIJ participants thus found it helpful to discuss an
important and enduring concern for international justice institutions-the impact
of their work and how it might be measured. Much like the fairness and
accessibility of international courts and tribunals, their impact is one of the
elements to consider when gauging the conformity of contemporary international
justice to the emerging notion of an international rule of law.
The impact of international courts and tribunals is complicated to describe
and difficult to document. The impact may include successfully preventing
armed conflict, securing a peaceful settlement of boundaries, deterring serious
violations of the law, achieving the overall objectives of an international treaty,
and obtaining compliance with specific judgments. Moreover, the impact may be
dependent upon action by a national jurisdiction, which, in turn, might be carried
out by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government.
Additionally, international tribunals may have an anticipatory effect on the
actions of nations or individuals that is difficult to record.
Participants chose to approach the topic by examining two issues: 1) rates of
compliance with the decisions of their respective courts and tribunals, and 2)
other types of impact created through their work.
One of the definitions suggested for "compliance" was that articulated by
Aloysius Llamzon: "Compliance connotes many things, but to be meaningful it
should consist of acceptance of the judgment as final and reasonable performance in
good faith of any binding obligation."38 Participants noted, first of all, that courts
and tribunals need to establish "climates of compliance" since most do not have
formal enforcement mechanisms. This is the case with ITLOS, for example, as the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not provide for such a
mechanism. Nonetheless, parties to disputes brought before ITLOS are required to
comply with its decisions, which are considered final, and, to date, they have
consistently done so.
The WTO is also frequently pointed out as an institution that has an excellent
compliance record for its various decisions. Some observers believe that this is
due to its ability to impose retaliatory sanctions if the losing party does not come
into compliance. But others disagree with this interpretation, believing instead
that nations comply less out of fear of retaliation but rather because they believe
it is in their interest to do so. They benefit from rules, and care about their
reputations as well as their relationships with other countries.39 Nations also may
38. Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of
Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 822 (2007).
39. ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WTO
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calculate that if they comply with an unfavorable decision now, in the future
when they win, the losing party will also be more likely to come into compliance.
Despite this positive attitude by parties, there are an increasing number of cases
pending at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that pertain to compliance issues.
"One party states that they have complied completely, while the other says there
is non-compliance," observed a judge. As a result, a separate set of proceedings
have arisen where dispute panels and the Appellate Body determined whether or
not the steps taken by the losing party constituted full compliance.
With regard to compliance with ICJ judgments, there was some difference of
opinion about how to assess it. Some scholars think that compliance rates for ICJ
judgments have been poorly studied and thus little is known about what happens
after the judgments are issued."' Others believe that states bringing cases under the
system of compulsory jurisdiction at the Court do not have the same interest in the
judicial process as those that voluntarily bring a case for dispute settlement. Their
compliance is thus less certain.41 One BIIJ participant contested such views. "The
function of the Court is squarely focused on Chapter VI of the United Nations
Charter. A judgment of the ICJ is the one strictly judicial means of settling disputes
and therefore compliance is important." Furthermore, compliance is obligatory
according to Chapter XIV of the Charter (see infra). He added that while the level
of compliance with judgments is not inconsiderable, the Court should not be
"complacent" in this area. Furthermore, the Court could benefit from more support
from the Security Council in ensuring compliance. It was pointed out that a
weakness in the U.N. system is that a permanent member of the Security Council
can veto sanctions for non-compliance-an option not open to a less powerful
state-thereby undermining the Court's authority.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2007).
40. Llamzon, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. U.N. Charter art. 33, paras. 1-2, art. 94, paras. 1-2 (the Charter of the United Nations was opened for
signature on June 26, 1945 and entered into force on October 24, 1945).
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The Avena case might serve as an illustration of how a powerful country
reacts to an unfavorable decision. In the course of two decisions, LaGrand
and Avena,43 the ICJ found that the United States was in violation of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("VCCR")4 for its failure to
notify detained foreign nationals of the right to contact their respective
consulates. The ICJ further found that, in order to be in compliance with the
treaty, the United States had to "allow the review and reconsideration of the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in the VCCR." Most observers would agree that U.S. compliance with
the Avena judgment has been slow and uneven. Nevertheless, there are some
gradual developments towards compliance. In July 2010, the U.S. State
Department requested that Texas postpone an execution in a case in which a
VCCR violation was claimed. The basis for the request was that a federal
legislative proposal was under consideration that would allow for a hearing
on the violation.4 Even more recently, in January 2011, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court recognized the importance of the ICJ decisions and
held that a review of the effect of VCCR violations could be conducted
under their state rules on motions for new trials (see infra).
43. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
44. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S 261 (entered into force Mar.
19, 1967).
45. Craig Kapitan, Foreign Killer's Death Slated, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/default/article/Foreignkiller-sdeathslated-798848.php.
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An issue that has been raised in relation to international judgments, such as
those of the ICJ, is the effect of compliance on the sovereignty of nations. Some
believe that WTO decisions may also challenge sovereignty by encouraging
"anticipatory compliance," whereby lawmakers refrain from taking action that
would be in accordance with national law because they anticipate that such laws
would violate WTO rules. 7 The CCJ has sought to avoid such reactions on the
part of member states of the Caribbean Community, even incorporating language
into its first judgment explicitly about the relationship between Community
membership and sovereignty:
The rule of law brings with it legal certainty and protection of the rights
of states and individuals alike, but at the same time of necessity it creates
legal accountability. Even if such accountability imposes some constraint
upon the exercise of sovereign rights of states, the very acceptance of
such a constraint in a treaty is in itself an act of sovereignty.
4
1
The question of how to monitor compliance with judgments was a topic of
interest to all participants. Unlike many international courts and tribunals, the
ECHR has a mechanism to follow up on the many judgments it issues every year.
Fortunately for the Court, it is not charged with reviewing the "execution of
judgments," as it is termed in the European system. This task falls instead to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which meets regularly to
examine the measures taken by the states named in judgments.49
46. Commonwealth v. Gautreaux, 458 Mass. 741 (2011).
47. Tina Potuto Kimble, Anticipatory Compliance with WTO Rules and the Erosion of US Sovereignty,
25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 97 (2006).
48. Trinidad Cement Ltd. v. Guyana [2009] CCJ 1 (OJ) 32 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments/arl-2008/arl2008.judgement.pdf.
49. Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
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There are several actions that have to take place in order for a judgment of
the ECHR to be deemed fully executed. The state is naturally required to end the
violation cited in the judgment and to make reparation to the victim(s). But
perhaps the most important step to be carried out is a modification of legislation
or activity at the national level in order to prevent a recurrence of the violation in
question. It was reported that the first part of the judgment is typically not hard to
execute. But when it comes to taking legislative measures, the challenges to full
execution are much greater. Some judgments are reviewed repeatedly before the
Committee of Ministers is satisfied with their execution.
The execution of IACHR judgments is also followed closely, although it is
the Court itself that does the monitoring. Like its European counterpart, the Inter-
American Court does not consider a case closed until full compliance is obtained.
Ultimately there is a high rate of compliance, but cases often remain "active" for
many years before all of the necessary measures are taken.
As for the ACHPR, it has yet to test the efficacy of its monitoring
mechanism. Its protocol makes provision, however, for the Executive Council of
the African Union to monitor judgment compliance by the defendant state and to
pinpoint cases of non-compliance. °
Participants then took the conversation beyond compliance as it pertains
strictly to judgments. There are also a number of "compliance issues" faced by
criminal courts that have to do with cooperation and assistance by states. One
judge commented on the difficulty of forcing powerful states to comply with a
court's request. He recounted that his chamber once called for documents
pertaining to a trial from a permanent member of the Security Council and the
state only partially satisfied the request. What are the limits of a judicial body, he
wondered, in ensuring full compliance in such a situation?
Another criminal judge noted that lack of compliance can begin long before a
case comes to trial, with the refusal of states to act on arrest warrants issued by
tribunals. "All tribunals have suffered from the lack of cooperation, at least of
swift cooperation, by states," he declared. Often this resistance comes from states
that have not ratified the treaty establishing the court or tribunal. In other cases,
however, even those states bound to comply are unwilling to do so. "We need to
measure compliance with regard to international criminal courts and tribunals in
terms of effective criminal cooperation," suggested a participant. "This is the
lifeblood of courts, the air they need to breathe. They can't function without it."
While acknowledging the existence of these difficulties, another criminal
judge pointed out that states have by and large cooperated with his tribunal.
"Typically, the compliance has been quite good. We issue hundreds of decisions,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/ (last updated Oct. 14, 2011).
50. ACHPR, supra note 16, art. 29 ("Notification of Judgment: 1. The parties to the case shall be
notified of the judgment of the Court and it shall be transmitted to the Member States of the OAU and the
Commission. 2. The Council of Ministers shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution
on behalf of the Assembly.").
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 24
logistical questions, requests for documents, and so on. Most of these orders are
complied with quickly and routinely." When a state does not wish to cooperate,
for example by carrying out an arrest warrant or subpoenaing a witness, it usually
argues "inability to comply." This may occur even with states that are highly
supportive of the tribunal's work. He added that the rate of compliance has
increased following a move by the international community-including the
United Nations, United States, and European Union-to pressure states for
cooperation.
Participants next turned their attention to the impact of international justice
that is beyond the scope of compliance with judgments or requests for
cooperation. It was pointed out that the decisions of international courts and
tribunals have had an enormous impact on "the legal awareness of the world."
One example cited was the groundbreaking work of the ad hoc tribunals: "The
impact of the ICTY and ICTR cannot be measured in terms of the indictments
and cases decided. It's shortsighted, too narrow if you want to measure the real
impact," said one judge. He added, "How would we think about crimes against
humanity if we didn't have the ICTY clarifying that they can be committed in
non-international as well as international armed conflict, and in peacetime!"
Another judge concurred, stating that the international community is now
well aware that international prosecutions and trials can be done credibly, and
that criminal tribunals have contributed to substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary criminal law. Furthermore, it is clear that the message about impunity
is being communicated: "There is no question whatsoever that in the most recent
practice of armed forces, the possibility of condemnation and prosecution is
taken much more seriously." Clearly, as ICTY Judge Fausto Pocar has written,
the so-called "completion strategy" of his tribunal should more properly be
viewed as a "continuation strategy." The temporary criminal tribunals will
continue to impact the development of international law as well as the
implementation of that law in national jurisdictions long after they formally close
down."
An important point was also made about the powerful impact that
international courts and tribunals have had on legal education as well as interest
by the media and general public in international law. "There is a completely new
world that began in 1993 with the creation of the ad hoc tribunals," declared a
participant. "Go to any bookstore, legal or non-legal, and you will find hundreds
of books dealing with this issue."
The discussion ended by circling back to ideas raised in earlier sessions. The
notion that the standing of international justice can be enhanced through opening
it up to those it affects was reiterated. "To increase the impact of international
law, recipients need to feel that they are participating in its creation. Perhaps then
they will be more willing to comply with its mechanisms. We should look at this
51. Cf Fausto Pocar, Completion or Continuation Strategy?, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 655 (2008).
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issue from the recipients' viewpoint." Another judge stressed the importance of
looking at the question of impact in a holistic manner. "One should not separate
out compliance with judgments from other kinds of impacts," he said, noting the
systemic nature of the international rule of law.
Very importantly, a participant pointed out that the relationship between the
rule of law in different spheres should not be forgotten. Compliance with an
international decision contributes not only to the resolution of an interstate
dispute or the conviction of a war criminal, he offered. "It contributes also to
enforcing and strengthening the rule of law altogether, at both the domestic and
international levels."
What Does Diversity Imply for an International Rule of Law?
International courts and tribunals are by nature heterogeneous institutions,
bringing together judges and staff who have various nationalities and languages
as well as different types of legal training and professional experience. This
diversity extends to the parties appearing before courts and tribunals and, of
course, to the public affected by their work. BIIJ participants discussed some of
the questions surrounding diversity and its potential impact on the establishment
of a rule of law that can be embraced and supported across the globe. For
example, does the varied experience of international justice actors with the rule
of law at the domestic level influence their understanding of how it might
function at the international level? Is some uniformity in the conception and
application of the rule of law a prerequisite for its international extension? Does
the long-term legitimacy of international justice institutions depend on a shared
sense of the notion?
Several participants prefaced the conversation by noting that diversity was
not a topic that they were accustomed to discussing, although they acknowledged
its importance to the work of their institutions and, ultimately, for the
development of an international rule of law. The discussion began with
reflections on the concept of "dissonance" and its impact on the work of
international courts and tribunals. One legal scholar has used this term to
describe the "poor sociological fit" that exists between the methods and concepts
used in international criminal justice and some of the non-Western contexts in
which they are applied." More generally, this term can be extended to signify any
kind of "mismatch" created by the coming together of distinct cultural systems.
Judges were asked whether they experience any situations of dissonance in their
own institutions and, if so, how they are resolved.
52. Tim Kelsall, International Criminal Justice and Non-Western Cultures (Oxford Transitional Just.
Research, Working Paper Ser. 1, Apr. 2010), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Kelsall_
InternationalCriminalJusticeFinal.pdf.
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A criminal judge quickly responded to the question, remarking, "What you
call dissonance, we experience it every day!" In the case of his court, the
mismatch is between legal cultures: the adversarial trial approach of the common
law system and the inquisitorial trial approach of the civil law system. He
explained that in the early days of his institution, common law judges discovered
that they had to draw considerably from the civil law system to develop practices
that expedited procedures. "We had to reconcile the two systems, but it can be
done by looking at fairness. That is the overarching principle." Another criminal
judge noted the same tensions in his own chamber, but believed they could be
resolved by appealing to another principle. "We have a judge who is from a civil
law tradition, a presiding judge from a common law tradition, and another who is
an academic. Our common denominator is common sense."
Several participants objected, however, to the idea that there is a "common
sense" that all judges can call upon to resolve differences in approach or thinking.
"Common sense isn't always so common," said one. Judges have to actively shed
their presumptions about how to reason and move toward a position consistent
with international law, he continued. Nonetheless, suggested a participant from a
regional court embracing five regions and three legal systems (civil, common, and
Islamic), "judges can develop their own culture of compromise, common
understanding, and tolerance."
A number of other diversity issues were raised in relation to international
criminal jurisdictions. Some judges mentioned the problems associated with
language diversity, both among judges and among parties before the court.53 One
participant noted that courts dealing with inter-ethnic conflicts are "constantly
examined through a magnifying glass to see that we do not prefer group X over
group Y and that we are fair in selecting the targets of our prosecution." Another
kind of dissonance was described as arising in criminal courts: that between the
expectations of the parties-that is, the prosecutor and criminal defendants-on
the one hand, and the broader public on the other. Whereas the former may
understand a trial to be about the guilt or innocence of the accused, the latter may
expect it also to establish a historical record or contribute to the healing of
victims.
Moving beyond the experience of international criminal courts, which may
experience diversity in particularly vexing ways due to the nature of their
jurisdictions, participants brought up issues more general to the international
justice system. A human rights judge mentioned how the different professional
backgrounds of fellow judges seem to correlate with a variable willingness to
consider the court's own precedents in the interest of creating a consistent and
coherent body of caselaw. On such matters, it was noted, "courts need to have
their own internal rule of law."
53. Challenges associated with language diversity in international courts and tribunals were treated at
length at BIIJ 2009. For a summary of this discussion, see 2009 BIn REPORT, supra note 8.
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It was also pointed out that possible misunderstandings or misperceptions in
the media about international judicial decisions may stem from another difficulty
facing international judges-the challenge of writing judgments in a manner that
is understood and accepted not only by the parties to the dispute but also by
different peoples and populations in the world. This challenge may be
particularly acute in cases that have important repercussions on questions such as
the self-determination of peoples, for instance.54
In the end, most participants agreed that diversity at the level of the bench
or institution, even if the source of occasional dissonance, does not generally
inhibit effective work or the overall aim of delivering justice. "This diversity
exists; it is a fact of life, a positive thing if managed properly," said one. Where
diversity may pose a problem, however, is at the level of the societies that must
collectively engage in establishing an international rule of law. Some parts of
the world are already part of the effort, while others appear to need more time
and preparation before fully joining in. This came out clearly in comments
from non-European participants who spoke from a dual perspective-that of
global citizen and local culture-bearer-on the place of their respective
societies in this global endeavor.
One participant explained how certain international norms are seen in his
country and offered a rationale for these views. It is clear that contemporary
notions of the rule of law, like the separation of powers, were imposed as part of
European colonial rule. "Ours is a tribal and cultural society, where judicial and
executive roles are all embodied in the chief. So when a new institution came
with a separation of powers, there was a measure of confusion and the traditional
leaders saw their powers being drained away." This unfamiliarity has impeded
the establishment of a domestic rule of law; participation in an international one
is an even more distant goal.
The colonial experience was referenced by a second judge as well, not in the
context of cultural diversity but instead with regard to the differences that exist
between poor and affluent countries.
I think we need to be patient with developing countries, where certain
aspects of the rule of law, like the separation of powers, are relatively
new ideas. What is the impact on the psyche of a people in an emerging
state that has been ravaged by colonialism for hundreds of years? How
do we expect a people and a state coming out of that to advance and
progress in the same fashion and at the same rate as countries that have
not had that same experience?
54. E.g., Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (July 22, 2010).
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In response, a European judge reminded the group that the separation of
powers is a very recent phenomenon in Western societies as well, dating back in
some cases only to the 1 9 h century.
Whereas these participants invoked situations in which international legal
norms were imposed from the outside and met with some resistance, a third judge
described how his country actively embraced these norms in order to "become
accepted into the civilized community of nations." It now stands at the forefront
of nations in its region on issues of international law, serving as "a symbol to the
whole world," he said. This judge vehemently rejected the view that different
fundamental values should be allowed to hold sway in his region, especially
when this view is espoused by repressive regimes wishing to justify their
policies. Another judge concurred: "Is it not possible that some governments may
use real or alleged diversity as a pretext for not accepting their international legal
obligations?"
Some participants remained certain, however, that similarities outweigh
differences on basic issues pertaining to international norms. One judge
commented thus on the Rome Statute:
Cultural diversity may be a complicating factor for the international rule
of law, but it does not make it impossible. Support for the Rome Statute
overcame the traditional dividing lines between North/South and
East/West. It is my assumption that, despite all cultural diversities, there
is a common view among all populations of the world that perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity must be held
accountable, regardless of their rank or nationality or ideology.
He added that polling among the populations impacted by the crimes currently
under investigation by the ICC largely shows support for the court's work,
despite its distance and "strangeness." People seem to trust the ICC more than
their local judiciary, he claimed, an observation that recalled an earlier comment
by a participant about how the international rule of law may in some cases
replace a failed domestic rule of law.
Over the course of the discussion, queries about the impact of diversity on an
international conception of the rule of law gradually evolved into the inverse
question: Might the search for universally accepted legal norms be impeded
instead by a lack of diversity? In other words, might the absence of input from all
concerned parties undermine the persuasive power of an international rule of
law?
It was pointed out that "not all states are equal" in the international arena.
The historically disproportionate presence of economic and political
powerhouses-including the permanent members of the Security Council-in
institutions like the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body exemplifies this situation.
The ICC's focus to date on serious crimes in Africa, to the exclusion, critics say,
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of those crimes committed in other regions, is also frequently cited as evidence
of the developing world's relative powerlessness in the international
community. The fundamental question is, then, the following: if all societies
have not contributed equally to the development of international institutions and
the legal foundations upon which they rest, will they be as committed to what
these institutions stand for and uphold them accordingly?
This question clearly struck a chord among participants, European and non-
European alike. Said one judge, "I'd like to emphasize that diversity itself
doesn't matter. Overcoming diversity is related to a sense of participation. It is
crucial that you've participated in the process, even if your opinion was not taken
as a majority opinion and the final structure is different from what you wanted."
Another elaborated on the theme of participation: "We need the participation of
countries all over the world, whether East, West, North, or South, in creating
international processes."
One scholar has suggested that problems in international criminal justice
derive from "the relation between the international 'community' that makes
international law-comprised of activists, academics, statesmen and lawyers, at
the pinnacle of which are the States Parties themselves-and the less
cosmopolitan communities existing on their periphery. 5 BIIJ participants
articulated this same dilemma in terms of domination. One judge suggested,
To ensure that diversity is not a problem for an international rule of law,
but instead good for it, I think the most important and critical thing is
that all institutions and diverse groups are fairly represented in the
statutes. There should be no domination of one group over another, and
no apparent imbalance. If representation is agreed to, diversity should not
be an impediment.
His view was echoed by another: "Diversity as such-cultural, ethnic, and so
on-is not a negative factor per se for the emergence of international law. But
there must not be domination."
It is clear that despite the global dissemination of information and
commodities, the world will continue to be diverse-in culture, language,
religion, political belief, and many other ways-for the foreseeable future.
International justice institutions, like other entities meant to serve broad
constituencies, would do well to consider what this fundamental characteristic of
human life means for their work. They furthermore should be careful to listen to
the many voices with something to say about it. Although BIIJ participants
reached no definitive conclusions about the impact of diversity-or the lack
thereof-on an international rule of law, it was clear that a consideration of
diversity can only contribute to its ascendancy.
55. Kelsall, supra note 52, at 2.
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Topics in Ethical Practice: Challenges to Judicial Independence
As in past Institutes, BIIJ 2010 participants had the opportunity to reflect on
ethical issues confronting judges who serve on international courts and tribunals.
Discussions about judicial ethics in the international sphere are a hallmark of the
BIIJ; earlier institutes have focused on topics as wide-ranging as "the
international judiciary as a new moral authority," "the shaping of the judicial
persona," and "the development of ethics guidelines for international courts and
tribunals. 56 In 2010, participants addressed the recurring topic of judicial
independence, with particular emphasis on its critical relation to the rule of law.57
More specifically, they discussed the challenges of working under the gaze of a
public that holds judges to the highest standards of behavior and practice and
criticizes any deviation-real or perceived-from the ideal.
The first topic participants grappled with was the election and reelection of
judges in the international context. 8 The manner in which international judges
reach their posts has often been criticized, and a recently published monograph
on the topic does little to reassure the public that the process is transparent or
politically neutral.59 Given the importance of public confidence in international
courts and tribunals-to encourage compliance with their judgments as well as to
ensure their financial and moral support-it is crucial that the members of their
benches be seen as independent beyond a doubt. Current practices surrounding
the election and reelection of international judges may serve, however, to cast
public doubt upon their independence.
Participants had many comments to offer about the election and reelection
procedures in their respective courts and tribunals. Elections that take place
within the U.N. system were particularly criticized, both for the lack of
transparency in how judicial candidates are nominated, and for "horse trading" at
election time. This term refers to the promises and counter-promises made among
states to support one another's candidates for high-profile posts, including
judicial positions at the ICJ, ITLOS, ICTY, and ICTR. It was noted that the
qualifications of a candidate are just one of the factors that come into play. When
the ICC was established, the Assembly of States Parties valiantly tried to keep its
judicial elections from following the model of the U.N. courts, but it was not
successful. "It simply turned out to be impossible," reported a participant who
attended the Rome Conference, "to achieve a prohibition on these kinds of
56. To download the ethical discussions from all past sessions of the BIIJ, see Int'l Ctr. for Ethics,
Justice, and Pub. Life, Ethics and the International Judiciary, BRANDEIS UNIv., http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/
internationaljustice/ethicsintljud.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
57. Meron, supra note 26.
58. See also 2007 BIIJ REPORT, supra note 8.
59. RUTH MACKENZIE, KATE MALLESON, PENNY MARTIN & PHILIPPE SANDS, SELECTING INTERNATIONAL
JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS (2010).
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agreements among states."' One participant also remarked on the inappropriate
"judicial campaigning" that, he said, inevitably accompanies elections at the
United Nations: "Judges depend on the General Assembly for their election and
reelection and it is standard practice for them to visit various diplomatic
delegations to lobby for their votes."
Several judges pointed to institutional practices that seek to emphasize the
merits of judicial candidates, thereby mitigating the influence of national
interests in election procedures. Some members of the WTO now put forward
several candidates for a position on the Appellate Body, allowing the
organization to select the one they consider the most qualified. The protocol of
the ACHPR also allows states to put forward multiple candidates for the coveted
spots on its eleven-member bench. But only one can be their own national-any
additional nominees must be nationals of another African state,
If inappropriate influence sometimes intrudes into the election of judges, this
occurs to an even greater extent, it was agreed, when they stand for reelection.
One participant noted that at his court, judges have four-year initial terms with
the possibility of reelection: "Even the most honest and honorable of my
colleagues feel pressure to tone down their decisions; even hardworking, ethical
people feel that they need to be careful when elections are coming." Another
participant observed, "At my court, judges are no doubt aware that taking a
controversial position in an unpopular decision could have an effect on their
reelection." However, he was not convinced that they would act on this
knowledge: "I am confident that the judges' sense of professionalism would
prevail."
It was pointed out, however, that reelection is one of the ways to achieve
continuity, which is particularly important in courts with a temporary
jurisdiction. At the ICTY and ICTR, where terms are short and the work intense,
it may be beneficial for the institutions to have reelected judges on the bench for
this reason. "Otherwise, there would be a sacrifice in judicial experience and
efficiency." As part of the ad hoc tribunals' "completion strategy," ICTY and
ICTR judges recently had their terms extended, by a Security Council
resolution,6 until the completion of the trials to which they are assigned. This
obviates the need for any future elections, which would further slow down the
tribunals' work, while also contributing to the stability of the institutions and the
accumulation of judicial expertise. The international judges serving on the
ECCC benefit from a similarly open-ended situation-they have no fixed term
60. Civil society can play a role in depoliticizing the nomination and election of international judges. In
anticipation of the election of six new ICC judges in 2011, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
convened the Independent Panel on International Criminal Court Judicial Elections to oversee this process with
the goal of having the most qualified judges for the 2012-2021 term. Announcement to the Assembly of State
Parties on the Independent Panel on International Criminal Court Judicial Elections, COALMON INT'L CRIM.
CT. (Dec. 2010), http://www.coalitionfortheicc.orgldocuments/Judicial-Panel-Announcement.pdf.
61. S.C. Res. 1931, 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1931 (June 29, 2010).
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at all, but rather were appointed by the United Nations to serve on the bench
"for the duration of the proceedings." 62 The judges of the STL, in contrast, were
appointed for an initial term of three years in 2009 and may be reappointed "for
a further period to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with
the [Lebanese] Government.,
63
However, for permanent courts with longer judicial terms-ICJ and ITLOS
judges, for instance, sit for nine years-a prohibition on reelection would not
have the same potential effect on institutional performance. In arguing for term
limits, a participant also observed that "it is not only good judges who get
reelected." Many international judges try for second terms, and since they have
an advantage in the election process, they may prevail over other candidates.
One participant pointed out another possible negative impact of having judges
serve for years and years on the same bench: if judges make judging a "lifetime
career," he suggested, "it may not be helpful to the international system or the
development of international law."
Notably, the ICC chose to avoid the suspicions and problems that
accompany reelection by instituting nine-year non-renewable terms, 6' a
seemingly wise decision for a closely observed court that deals with sensitive
matters and is engaged in the development of a still emerging field, international
criminal law. In fact, all BIIJ participants essentially agreed that instituting a
single and relatively long term for judgeships in international courts and
tribunals would do much to remove the threats to judicial independence as well
as other drawbacks of reelection.65 Even judges who had benefited from
reelection expressed this point of view. "I am on record," said a judge who has
served consecutive terms, "as preferring single, non-renewable terms for judges
at international tribunals." Said another judge in the same situation, "The
reelection of judges is not a desirable practice to be used in international courts,
including my own." One participant even suggested that BIIJ participants make
a collective and public statement recommending that international judicial
reelections be abolished.
62. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning
the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea,
G.A. Res. 57/228B, art. 3(7), 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 (June 6, 2003).
63. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, annex art. 2(7), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
64. The first cohort of ICC judges elected in 2003 had terms of variable length-three, six, or nine years.
Those with the shortest terms were allowed to stand for reelection. Going forward, however, all ICC judges are
to be elected for a single nine-year term.
65. Long non-renewable terms are also seen as optimal at the domestic level. See Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/4/25 (Jan. 18, 2007) (by Leandro Despouy). The
report expresses concern with short terms of office at the domestic level and recommends the gradual extension
of judicial tenures so as to progressively introduce life tenure in domestic systems (especially in states in
transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy).
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But such a prohibition would still leave some problems unresolved. If an
unqualified individual is sitting on the bench, a single term can still be too long,
declared one participant. "When the initial election is not a good one, you have
to wait for years before changing the judge!" Single terms may also increase the
number of former international judges looking for a professional niche where
they can apply their expertise. Some may take on the role of counsel or agents
before international courts, including the one in which they recently served. This
tendency necessitates the establishment of "cooling-off periods," during which
time former judges may not be involved in proceedings before their old court.
This phenomenon may lead to a certain "recirculation" of legal experts in
international justice circles, which could ultimately stifle the development of
international law, as mentioned above. It could also, however, produce the
opposite effect by leading to a richer and fuller development of international law
by those with great experience and expertise.
The issue of post-judicial professional life may be most acute at the ECHR.
Not only has it recently instituted a single, non-renewable judicial term,6 but its
judges are becoming younger and younger; some are even elected to the court
while in their thirties. Furthermore, most ECHR judges are drawn from national
legal professions, not from the ranks of international lawyers. This means that
they will naturally look to return home after leaving the ECHR, and will seek to
work for the state in some capacity. This creates a new dilemma in terms of
judicial independence: will judges nearing the end of their terms at the ECHR
issue judgments more favorable to their states, as insurance for a future position
at home? Clearly, threats to independence do not necessarily disappear with the
prohibition of judicial reelection. One participant suggested that international
judges should be nominated for single terms toward the ends of their careers to
minimize such risks.
Participants then turned their attention from judicial elections and reelections
to other matters that may create public doubt about the independence of
international judges. "Judges do not come to the bench as virgins of public life,"
declared one participant. They may have affiliations with political organizations
and NGOs, a long list of publications if they are scholars, and an easily
accessible record of non-judicial activities, speeches, and commercial interests.
All of these may be raised as possible reasons that international judges are unable
to perform their work with independence and impartiality.
The question of when interest in or connection to a case by a judge
necessitates recusal was immediately raised. One criminal court has had high-
profile cases where its judges were on the record expressing opinions about the
behavior of accused persons. One participant asked whether it would be
preferable for a body outside the court to determine recusal in such situations,
66. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Amending the Controls System of the Convention, May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194.
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instead of judicial colleagues. Are fellow judges not likely to support the judge
in question, or alternatively to join against him, he wondered? And does an
internal decision not create a perception of bias in the public eye? A different
issue related to bias was brought up with reference to the ECCC. Normally a
judge should not sit on a case with which he has a personal connection. But it
was virtually impossible to find Cambodian judges who had not been touched by
the Khmer Rouge events under investigation by the court. The recusal provisions
in the ECCC rules were debated and ultimately made more flexible so as not to
systematically preclude the participation of local judges in the trials.
Participants also discussed when experience on one international court
should prevent participation in a related matter before another. For example,
should a criminal judge who has deliberated on questions of genocide refrain
from sitting on an interstate dispute resolution body that is looking at the
crimes from a different standpoint? One judge offered this opinion: "I don't see
much of a problem if it is only a legal question of genocide. I think this is a
situation that domestic judges deal with every day, sitting on cases that deal
with the same legal issues." Another judge added this comment: "Disqualifying
someone just because they have expressed certain views on crimes against
humanity or war crimes is not a good enough reason." Human rights
institutions may also see situations where their judges have dealt with an issue
before the court while previously serving in their capacity as judges in their
home country. While some believed that this would not necessarily pose a legal
problem, others felt that this might well create a perception of bias.
How judges interact with the media, and when these interactions overstep
an appropriate boundary, also came up as a topic of discussion. How should a
judge deal with requests for interviews, or answer questions that the press may
have about the judge himself or his institution? "On the one hand," said a
participant, "a judge should not seem aloof from society, but on the other hand,
he should avoid seeking the limelight." He recounted an incident in which a
fellow judge gave a lengthy interview to a newspaper where he made critical
comments about the political situation of the country hosting the court. "Our
president felt obliged to disavow the interview and publicly reprimand the
judge," he continued, a response justified by the court's code of ethics. Another
participant reported that he had recently been asked by the media in his home
country to speak about his court and explain its function to the local population.
"I think this is useful and important for the public; we need to explain what our
courts do and do not do, but not to speak on specific cases. My inclination is
that this is a good exercise of discretion from the viewpoint of educating the
public." Another participant went on to suggest that speaking to the press about
cases, once a judgment has been delivered, should not be out of the question. "I
would cautiously encourage it because I think the court should enlighten and
educate, and this is better done by a judge than a press secretary. That is, if he
is capable of going out and facing a microphone and camera."
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Participants noted a number of other questions about judicial ethics, and its
perception, that cannot be answered by referring to their courts' rules or codes
of conduct.67 In what situations can a judge carry out arbitrations, particularly
of a commercial nature? What kinds of secondary employment are compatible
with a part-time judicial position? How much can and should an international
judge speak in public about legal issues of contemporary importance? Since
such questions do not generally involve potentially serious violations of
judicial ethics, they are often left up to the discretion of individual judges, with
advice from the court president or colleagues when requested. It was suggested
that international courts might do well to look for guidance in detailed codes of
judicial conduct, like the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. 6 However,
some courts have resisted the elaboration of such codes, believing that broad
notions of appropriate judicial conduct suffice.69
It is clear that trust in the international justice system relies to an important
degree on public confidence in those who serve as its judges. It is thus up to
judges themselves, one judge exhorted, "to exercise continuous discretion in
order to preserve a sense of judicial independence and impartiality." He went
on to add an important point, undoubtedly already acknowledged by those in
attendance at the BIIJ: "In becoming a judge, you must sacrifice some of the
private space that others take for granted." Having judges who accept these
limitations without question is another foundational element for the international
rule of law.
Toward an International Rule of Law: Some Critical Elements
The sessions at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges 2010 raised a
wide array of issues related both to the practice of international judging and its
relationship to the international rule of law. Some issues are still under
consideration and will be developed further at future sessions of the BIIJ.
However, by the end of the Institute, certain key aspects of the international rule
of law had emerged from participant discussions and were the subject of general
consensus.
Under an international rule of law:
67. Indeed, not all international courts have such codes. For more information on judicial ethics in the
international sphere, to access the codes of ethics of international courts and tribunals that do exist, and to find a
link to the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, see Int'l Ctr. for Ethics,
Justice, & Pub. Life, supra note 56.
68. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conductVol02A-ChO2.pdf (last updated June 2, 2011).
69. TERRIs, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 19.
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- States observe widely-shared international law commitments consistent
with fundamental principles of human rights and respect for human
dignity.
- Interested constituencies (states, intergovernmental organizations, non-
state groups, and private entities and individuals) have access to
international judicial institutions.
- International judicial institutions embody principles of independence,
impartiality, equality before the law, fairness, non-arbitrariness,
openness, and respect toward cultural diversity.
- International judicial institutions and government authorities cooperate
to ensure compliance with decisions of international judicial institutions.
• All subjects and recipients of international law are able to contribute to
its substance and participate in its development.
Brandeis University hopes to create opportunities for a continued exploration
of what constitutes the international rule of law and how it can be successfully
built.
BREAK-OUT SESSIONS
While most sessions at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges 2010
followed a plenary format, judges serving on the benches of criminal, human
rights, and interstate dispute courts also had the opportunity to discuss issues of
particular interest to their type of jurisdiction. Participants conferred with one
another before the Institute and decided on a list of topics to discuss during their
respective break-out group sessions.
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals
In 2010, the BIIJ hosted judges from six international criminal courts and
tribunals, the largest number represented at the BIIJ to date. The institutions are
in different stages of operation, with the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL finishing their
mandates, the ECCC closer to the halfway mark, and the STL just beginning its
work. The only permanent criminal court in existence, the ICC, has been
operational since 2002 and, at the time of the Institute, had recently been the
subject of an extensive review conference at which its successes and challenges
were closely analyzed. 70 The eight criminal judges in attendance addressed two
critical issues for their institutions during the break-out session: the efficient
70. Rome Statute, supra note 17.
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conduct of trials, and the relationship between peace and justice in the work of
international criminal jurisdictions.
The international community frequently singles out for criticism both the
length and accompanying cost of proceedings in international criminal courts and
tribunals. Trials have an "expected lifespan," as one judge expressed it, but they
are frequently subject to slowdowns, often for reasons beyond the control of the
court. Given that the assembled group included two criminal court presidents and
a criminal court vice-president, in addition to two former presidents, the question
naturally arose as to what measures, if any, can be taken by those in court
leadership roles to ensure that there are no undue delays in proceedings. A judge
from a court working under a "completion strategy" noted that outside parties,
including funders and parent bodies, sometimes push for the quick conclusion of
a case.
There comes a time when pressures on funding or personnel-which
might be down-sized, as it is in my court-just make it wiser to end the
course of proceedings as early as possible. What can the president do to
see that more work is done in less time so the completion strategy may
be achieved?
"Even if there is not an outside concern," noted another participant, "judges,
including the president, have an overwhelming obligation to speak up about due
process proceedings because of the fundamental right to a speedy trial."
Participants acknowledged that court presidents have wide-ranging
responsibilities and powers, several of which can contribute to the efficient
conduct of trials. However, the measures they take have less to do with
expediting individual cases than with efficiently managing the court's overall
caseload. For example, the rules and procedures of a court may be amended to
maximize efficiency. The experience of the ICTY, which has been in operation
longer than the other institutions represented at the BIIJ, was particularly
instructive.
Among the many amendments made to the ICTY rules of procedure since the
tribunal's establishment were three that have helped to streamline judicial
proceedings: 1) the replacement of some oral testimony with written documents;
2) reduction in the scope of indictments, sometimes by as much as one-third; and
3) acceptance of "adjudicated facts" from earlier cases.
Regarding the latter, one judge expressed some misgivings: "What I don't
like is that this puts the burden on the defendant to disprove facts submitted by
the prosecution from previous cases." While court presidents generally do not
have a specific power to amend rules, they have the practical power to suggest
important changes to the rules committee or oversight body. As noted in an
earlier session of the Institute, the statutes of some courts do not allow for an
easy or rapid amendment process.
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Court presidents also carry out various managerial functions that impact the
efficiency of proceedings. For example, they oversee the scheduling of trials and
consult with the registry to ensure staff availability. Participants commented on
the unique way in which the ICTR schedules trials. While trial judges of both ad
hoc tribunals sit on two cases concurrently, ICTR judges switch back and forth
between the cases at two-month intervals. While this approach aims to bring
multiple trials to completion in a timely manner, it also creates issues in the flow
of work and necessitates that judges frequently readjust to a different case and a
different set of judicial colleagues. This scheduling model may also, pointed out
one judge, create subsequent problems. "In the long run, this will not speed up
trials because it means finishing many cases at the same time, which means
delaying the appeals. The appeals chamber will be flooded!"
More generally, participants agreed that the overall efficiency of their courts
is enhanced by cooperation and coordination among the different organs,
represented by the president-who often takes the lead during meetings-the
prosecutor, the registrar, and in some cases the head of defense. The ECCC is at a
disadvantage in this respect; it does not have a single president, but rather a
president for each of the chambers-pre-trial, trial, and appeals. It also does not
have a formal registry. The structure of the ECCC thus leads to challenges in
coordinating efforts for greater efficiency, some participants thought.
In some criminal courts and tribunals, the president has a direct power to
assign members of the bench to particular panels or cases; in others, he has the
power to recommend assignments. Either way, knowledge of which judges work
best together, and for which roles they are best suited, is important for the
composition of successful and efficient chambers. One participant noted,
We have two types of judges: criminal judges with experience in high-
profile cases and international lawyers. Judges are the natural choice for
the trial division. You should have an experienced criminal trial judge as
the presiding judge of the chamber. On the other side, academic and
international lawyers are maybe better in the appeals division.
The importance of having a "reserve" or "alternate" judge assigned to a case was
also noted. If a member of the panel falls ill, the reserve member can quickly take
over, eliminating the need for delays in the proceedings.7'
Finally, participants pointed out the important function a president plays in
relation to external parties. In some courts, the president oversees negotiations
with funding organizations and donors in order to secure the resources necessary
71. The high-profile trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor by the SCSL has taken this
precaution. The alternate judge on the case sits in on the proceedings so he is abreast of all developments. He
does not, however, have voting power unless he is called upon to replace one of the regular three judges of the
trial chamber. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 12(4) (2002), http://www.sc-sl.org/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd 1MJeEw%3D&.
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to carry out the institution's work in a timely manner. The president also
represents his court or tribunal before parent bodies, such as the U.N. Security
Council or the ICC Assembly of States Parties, and ensures that they understand
its needs and appreciate its successes.
In addition to performing a critical formal role in regard to the general
efficiency of his institution, a court or tribunal president also has a critical but
delicate informal role to play in coaxing along a particularly slow trial. A
participant expressed it this way:
The informal role of the president is difficult to explain. In addition to his
formal role, the personal influence of the president, exercised discreetly
and properly, can be very, very important. But even if he feels that a trial
could go faster, he must be respectful of judicial independence. The
extent to which a president can mention concerns to a presiding judge
depends on the temperament, vision, and character of the president
regarding what is appropriate to discuss.
Another criminal judge agreed with the need for caution in this regard. "The
president may set a general goal that a case be conducted in the most expeditious
manner, but not at the expense of the fairness of the trial." Several participants
observed that in the case of tension between the demands of the ad hoc tribunals'
completion strategies and due process, considerations of fairness and due process
trump all others.
The group then turned its attention to the issue of whether and how their
institutions can seek a balance between the objectives of peace and justice. A
fundamental question was asked: Should efforts to make peace during an
ongoing conflict have priority over the work of international criminal
jurisdictions? The peace versus justice issue is of increasing concern to certain
sectors of the international community and constituted one of the focus areas of
the recent ICC Review Conference.
Those in attendance agreed that the question of delaying justice in order to
promote peace in a situation of ongoing conflict does not usually fall within the
purview of judges. It is the prosecutor's role to issue an arrest warrant or bring an
indictment, and some discretion can be exercised around these issues in relation
to the particular circumstances. "But once the matter is before the court,"
declared a judge, "the judicial process must take precedence and run its course.
Otherwise international criminal justice would be severely compromised." The
ICC is unique in that its statute explicitly states that the Security Council may
temporarily suspend an investigation or prosecution in the interest of peace.72 One
72. Rome Statute, supra note 17, at art. 16. Deferral of investigation or prosecution:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by
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judge reported that he had objected strongly to the inclusion of this jurisdictional
limitation during the drafting of the Rome Statute.
Prosecutorial discretion and limitations notwithstanding, the reputations of
international criminal courts and tribunals suffer when the public believes that an
indictment or arrest warrant has stood in the way of peace. This in turn impacts
the work of judges. "So even when the decision to go ahead with the application
of an arrest warrant is in the hands of the prosecutor, we are all affected because
he is an integral part of the court!" bemoaned one judge. Reactions to the
indictment of Slobodan Milosevi6 in the early days of the ICTY, and more
recently the arrest warrant of Omar al-Bashir by the ICC, illustrate how
international courts may be seen by some observers as "the bad guys," foiling
peace efforts and prolonging the misery of local populations.
Participants then analyzed the peace versus justice issue from the standpoint
of rights. One judge's viewpoint was that whereas the right to justice is
individual, the right to peace is collective. How can one decide which is more
important? "It is not possible for a court to give preference to collective rights,"
he declared, "so justice must prevail." Another participant offered a different
view: "You describe peace as a collective right, but isn't it also an individual
right? Justice could be seen as a collective right, too-the two things have quite a
link."
Assembled judges once again had occasion to note the particularities of the
ECCC. The crimes under consideration by the court took place more than 30
years ago, and the conflict is long over. However, the tensions surrounding the
Khmer Rouge era still exist, and some parties believe that the court's work might
rekindle them and bring about another civil war. For how long after an incident
does an international criminal tribunal need to think about the relative benefits of
peace and justice, one judge queried? Another answered, "When mass crimes
occur in a country, the mere fact of exercising justice, even late, is a way of
coming to terms with the past."
Finally, participants observed that their institutions contribute to the regions
within their jurisdictions in several ways. In addition to investigating crimes and
bringing criminals to account, their work ideally engenders a sense of
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. Courts also frequently engage in
capacity-building in the affected regions, particularly in the judicial sector, and
their jurisprudence may have an important impact on domestic law there. These
contributions should be acknowledged and added into the peace-justice equation.
One judge commented, "The idea of 'no peace without justice' is always a
simplistic way of looking at the problem."
The group concluded that the topic of peace versus justice will continue to be
relevant for international criminal jurisdictions and recommended that it be
discussed in greater depth at a future Brandeis Institute for International Judges.
the Council under the same conditions.
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Human Rights Courts
When the BIIJ established the practice of break-out groups in 2007, the
ACHPR was a very young institution with little concrete experience. African
judges have often used this dialogue among human rights judges to learn about
how the African Court's peer institutions in Europe and the Americas deal with a
range of issues and challenges, such as how to coordinate the work of regional
human rights commissions and courts, how to monitor compliance with
judgments, and what types of reparations might be made to victims of human
rights violations. During BIIJ 2010, when the break-out session began by
addressing the sources of applicable law for human rights courts, the African
Court found itself a leader in the discussion.
Each human rights court has its own legal instrument that articulates the
rights that it has been established to protect, namely the European Convention on
Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. However, the protocol establishing the
African Court further indicates that the court shall also apply the provisions of
"any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned., 73
This creates a potentially vast jurisdiction for the African Court and poses some
fundamental questions, including how the term "human rights instrument" is to
be defined, and how the African Court can adequately assess violations of other
instruments.
The assembled human rights judges mentioned a wide array of human rights
instruments that might be pertinent to the work of the African Court. These
include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Conventions
of the International Labour Organization, and the case law of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee. One judge mentioned that even the latter's many comments
and recommendations might have to be taken into account.
One participant wondered whether the protocol should not be amended so as
to specify more clearly which additional instruments African judges are required
to consider as part of their jurisdiction. Could the judges do this themselves, or
might the Court's parent institution, the African Union, be called upon to restrict
the Court's jurisdiction? Another participant pointed out that the Court's
jurisdiction should not be conflated with its sources of law. The latter is more
easily specified, and, in some cases, there will be a body to resolve disputes
around a particular treaty so that the court can simply reject its own competence.
When the limits of jurisdiction are not clear, however, situations may arise in
which the Court is not sure whether a certain matter falls within its competence
or not.
Some members of the human rights group hesitated to take the openness of
the African Protocol toward multiple sources of law as a problem. "We can call it
73. ACHPR, supra note 16, at art. 7.
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a 'specificity' or 'feature' of the African system," one remarked. It is clear that
the Court should always start with an interpretation of the rights protected by its
own charter, and then "take inspiration from other pertinent legal instruments" as
needed, he continued. This may mean that the Court has to be careful not to go
against the interpretation or the jurisprudence of the United Nations or of other
treaty bodies. Not everyone agreed with this stance, however. "You will bind
your hands if you decide to follow the jurisprudence of a different body than your
court," declared one judge. Another suggested that cases from other relevant
bodies be cited by the African Court as "persuasive evidence," without being
considered binding.
In the end, most of the group agreed that while the African Court faces
challenges unfamiliar to its European and Inter-American counterparts, those
challenges can be resolved through future practice. Only through judicial
interpretation of matters before the African Court will the implications of the
provision to apply multiple human rights instruments become clear. "You have to
develop your own jurisprudence," exhorted one judge. "And this is very easy at
the beginning, when you have only one or two cases. But as you get more and
more, there is a fear of a lack of consistency." Over the coming years, the African
Court will need to balance its institutional independence against the desirability
of contributing to a coherently developed and global body of human rights
jurisprudence.
Human rights judges also discussed the justiciability of economic, social, and
cultural rights in their respective courts. Once again, the African Charter of
Human and Peoples' Rights is broader than the conventions of its sister courts,
guaranteeing, for example, rights to both education and health, among many
other rights. African judges thus eventually expect to see a number of
applications to their court claiming a violation of these rights. One judge
expressed some trepidation about handling such cases at the international level,
observing that "the justiciability of these rights is not yet understood or resolved
at the national level in many countries."
The European and Inter-American Courts have had some experience in
economic, social and cultural rights, and this was subsequently shared with the
group. The American Convention does not explicitly guarantee these rights-they
are instead covered by the San Salvador protocol to the Convention, which falls
outside of the IACHR's jurisdiction-except for the right to property. Rights that
are not spelled out in the Convention have, in some cases, been interpreted as an
adjunct to property rights, particularly with regard to the land and natural
resources of indigenous peoples. The ECHR similarly has much jurisprudence on
the right to property, as well as on the right to education, including whether higher
education is to be included as part of this right. There is no specific right to health
74. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), Nov.
16, 1999, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69.
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in the European Convention, but these issues are examined under Article 8 of the
Convention." Also, cases on the issue of withholding medical care, in particular
from prisoners, can be found as constituting a form of torture or of inhuman or
76
degrading treatment under Article 3 of that convention.
Participants concluded the session by agreeing that the African Court needs
to have a wide and inclusive approach to interpreting rights if it is to satisfy its
mandate. The experience of its sister courts will certainly be invaluable as it
navigates its way through a complex landscape of human rights law and
jurisprudence.
Interstate Courts
Judges serving on interstate dispute resolution bodies used the break-out
session to explore in more depth a number of issues raised in the plenary
sessions. These included access to their courts, the reluctance of states to submit
disputes to judicial resolution, securing the independence of judges, and the
enforcement of judicial determination.
The group began by providing the details of how parties access their
respective institutions-the ICJ, ITLOS, ECJ, and WTO Appellate Body. Several
follow a strict "state-only" model, so that any private party with a complaint
needs to have their state initiate a proceeding. One judge observed of the WTO
Appellate Body, "it may be difficult for private individuals or corporations to
convince their government to bring a case. They need to find enough information
that any harm to their imports or sales is the result of a government measure and
not a private behavior." Furthermore, it is also necessary that a government
function well and have the necessary resources to bring a case. "There may also
be reluctance on the part of some governments to participate unless the case is
very strong and they have an excellent chance of winning."
The ICJ also stands firm in allowing only states to come before it, and has
rejected cases that involved entities like the European Union or NATO. On the
other hand, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which shares premises with the
ICJ in The Hague, has expanded its original state-only jurisdiction to include
disputes, especially those of a financial nature, between states and companies.
While ITLOS is similar in many ways to the other U.N. dispute resolution body,
the ICJ, they differ on the matter of access. "The Law of the Sea Convention
recognized the need to grant access to international organizations and investors
involved in deep sea activities. That is why they broadened access." The CCJ
also accepts petitions from private parties, viewing them as an important part of
their constituency, one judge explained:
75. ECHR, supra note 24, at art. 8 ("Right to respect for private and family life.").
76. Id. at art. 3 ("Prohibition of torture.").
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This was a court established pursuant to the goals of a treaty that sought
to bring about a single Caribbean economy, and private actors were
naturally required to play a critical role in establishing this economy and
in making use of the advantages which this single economy afforded
them. It was thus important to permit and also give a generous
interpretation to the treaty that would give them access. We rejected the
notion that a private actor was incompetent to sue their own state.
With regard to the hesitation felt by states to submit disputes to international
courts, the assembled judges clearly recognized the political sensitivities that
might arise from an international proceeding. "That state that thinks it is in the
weaker position is often reluctant and puts the brakes on submitting a case for
international resolution." Sometimes a dispute will instead be submitted for
arbitration, a process over which states may feel they have more control. ITLOS,
in particular, currently finds itself underutilized. Eighteen cases have been
submitted to the Tribunal since it became operational in 1996, a record that does
not, however, compare unfavorably to that of other international judicial bodies
in the initial stages of their existence.
In contrast, the WTO Appellate Body does not suffer from a lack of
"business." Since the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding was reached
fifteen years ago, it has received 414 requests for dispute settlement and issued
160 panel reports, two-thirds of which have been appealed to the Appellate Body.
However, WTO cases are skewed toward developed countries-roughly three-
quarters of its cases have involved the United States or the European
Community-so a reluctance to submit disputes has existed among WTO
members that are less strong economically, although recent trends show more
cases being initiated by developing countries. One judge made the following
observation on this issue:
Some countries may have feared bringing an action against a more
powerful country. They may have been afraid of ramifications that they
could not be sure of, where in a sense they have created an adversarial
relationship with a country today that they may have to be in negotiations
with tomorrow.
The question of whether some countries are naturally more litigious than
others also came up over the course of the discussions. Stereotypes would
suggest that some regions, like Asia, have cultures that lend themselves more to
diplomatic negotiation than adversarial proceedings. Some judges felt that such
stereotypes should not be given much credence. In fact, it was pointed out, one-
third of WTO cases involve China, although often as a third party. It was
stressed, however, that the need for neighboring countries to maintain good
relations can be a real factor in discouraging interstate litigation. The jurisdiction
of the CCJ, for example, covers a small geographic area made up of tiny nations
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with interconnected histories. To date, there has been no state versus state case,
with governments in the Caribbean opting for non-judicial means to resolve their
disputes.
Other factors affecting a state's decision to submit a dispute for judicial
resolution were mentioned. One judge felt that commercial disputes were more
likely to be submitted than sovereignty disputes. Not only may there by pressure
from the private sector behind the former, but disputes over boundaries and other
disputes involving sovereignty may not be as detrimental if they linger on.
Another participant noted that cases involving human rights violations often have
strong civil society pressure impelling a government to bring an action. In the
end, the group agreed that the most compelling factor leading states to bring a
dispute for judicial resolution is the legal obligation to do so. Few courts operate,
however, with compulsory jurisdiction in relation to all states and all situations.
In regard to securing the independence of judges, the problems associated
with reelection to the benches of international courts and tribunals were once
again raised. The CCJ has a very different approach to judicial tenure than its
peer institutions, granting an appointment until age seventy-two (with the
possibility of a three-year extension to judges serving at this evolutionary phase
of the court)." The Caribbean Court also has a distinctive financial arrangement,
designed to ensure the independence of the bench vis-A-vis its parent body. When
the CCJ was established, members of the Caribbean Community contributed to a
trust fund whose annual returns would be sufficient to run the court. The
institutional leadership consequently does not find itself in the potentially
compromising position of soliciting funds from states that may end up as parties
before the court.
The question of the nationality of judges and its impact on their work was
also discussed. Nationality is a particularly sensitive issue for the courts
represented in the break-out group since the parties that appear before them are
states, and judges may be perceived as having an unavoidable bias in favor of
their home country. Institutions have dealt with this in different ways. At the ICJ
and ITLOS, "ad hoc" judges may be appointed to a case if a party does not have
a judge of its nationality sitting on the permanent bench. This strategy to
"neutralize" assumed bias is not seen as the optimal solution by many observers;
automatic recusal by judges from cases involving their home states is seen by
some as more logical. However, the addition of ad hoc judges to benches that are
already large may not, in the end, complicate matters too much, said a
participant. "And when you have an ad hoc judge, he can explain the domestic
77. Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Relating to the Tenure of
Office of Judges of the Court, June 7, 2007, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/courtinstruments/
Protocol%20relating%20to%20the%2OTenure%20of%2Judges%20CCJ%20with%20signatures%2June%2
2007.pdf.
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legal system much better, and we do at times have to apply domestic law.
Sometimes ad hoc judges have a useful purpose."
The WTO Appellate Body has adopted a different approach to nationality. Its
members are permitted to sit on cases involving their home states. "In a sense, we
are considered citizens of the world," explained a participant. An even more
delicate issue might be the former professional positions held by Appellate Body
members. Many have formerly worked for their governments on trade issues and
policies. These experiences may be what qualified them for their current position
in the first place, but may also require recusal from certain cases. The Appellate
Body adheres to an internal disclosure and recusal system for members to recuse
themselves from participating in cases in which the matter before the Appellate
Body is essentially the same as one addressed in their prior government work.
This system, however, suffers from a lack of transparency.
Interstate judges finished their session by revisiting the issue of compliance
with judgments and the implementation of decisions. The details of particular
cases were offered by the various participants, with descriptions of how
recalcitrance on the part of losing parties was dealt with. The WTO Appellate
Body is perhaps unique in that non-compliance by the losing party can be
countered with sanctioned retaliatory measures by the winning party. Generally,
participants agreed that compliance with their institutions' decisions was high,
even if they do not have a specific enforcement mechanism. As one participant
noted of his institution, "There is a growing tendency to believe that the
judgment of the court is the judgment you get from the global international
community. So there is a culture of shame if you do not follow it."
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
The BIIJ was honored to have as its keynote speaker Ms. Patricia 0 'Brien,
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Counsel of the United
Nations. She addressed BIIJ participants and members of the Salzburg legal
community on U.N. perspectives toward the Institute theme, "Toward an
International Rule of Law. " The following is an excerpt from her address."'
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am very pleased to be here at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges
and am greatly honoured to have been asked to give this keynote address.
It is quite a daunting task for me to speak nearing the end of a week of
discussions on the topic "Toward an International Rule of Law." The debate on
the meaning of an "international rule of law" is undoubtedly a crucial one in the
78. The entire text of the keynote address may be downloaded at the website of the United Nations.
Patricia O'Brien, Keynote Address at the Brandeis Institute for International Judges: Toward an International
Rule of Law (July 29, 2010), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/ infofrom_lc/]Brandeis%20Institute
%20for%20Intemational%2OJudges,%20Salzburg,%2029%2OJuly%202010.pdf.
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challenging times in which we live. And the promotion of the rule of law at the
international level necessarily requires an understanding of the role that the
international judge has to play in this context.
It is now almost two years since I joined the U.N. as Legal Counsel to head the
Office of Legal Affairs, which employs over 200 on a full time basis and
effectively acts as in-house Counsel to the Secretary-General, the senior
management and the wider U.N. system. Much of our work is, understandably,
carried out quietly and behind the scenes. But OLA's horizons, and the
expectations of OLA from within the U.N., run very wide.
Many of the issues that you have been discussing are an integral part of my
daily work. My perspective on these issues is therefore influenced by my own
professional experiences, by the legal work of the United Nations which I have
received the mandate to conduct, and by the challenges faced by the Organization
as I witness them every day.
I propose to describe some of the issues and challenges which the U.N. is
currently facing. It can safely be said that, since 1945, the Organization and its
Members have constantly striven to give practical meaning to the Charter's
resolve to establish conditions under which justice and respect for international
obligations can be maintained, and to develop legal bases for peaceful relations
between States. However, we all know that, in any political situation, the
importance given to a genuine legal assessment may vary: the U.N. has thus seen
periods of great advancement in international jurisprudence, just as there have
been times when our function as guardian of the global legal architecture has
seemed more peripheral. After almost two years in office, I believe that we live
in times where international law-and the role of the U.N. as its champion-is
absolutely central to the Organization and to the Secretary-General and his team.
My objective today is to demonstrate how this legal perspective has
contributed to a trend "toward an international rule of law." In doing so, I will
first refer to those numerous instances where the Organization reaches out to the
world and strives to contribute to the establishment of an international rule of
law. But I would also very much like to draw your attention to a less visible
aspect of the paradigm of the rule of law for the U.N. or, to be more specific,
within the U.N. In our Organization, acting in conformity with legal requirements
is a constant and dynamic pattern which is present in all our activities. In other
words, respect for the rule of law is, for the Organization, a goal to be achieved
every day.
1. Contributing to the Establishment of an International Rule of Law
So, to my first point: how the U.N. contributes to the establishment of an
international rule of law. Under Article 1 of the Charter, the United Nations is
expected to be "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations" in the attainment
of a number of common ends. These ends include: the maintenance of
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international peace and security; the development of friendly relations among
nations; international co-operation on economic, social, cultural or humanitarian
matters; and the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It became
obvious that the Organization is expected to take an active stance in the
attainment of the purposes of the Charter. From a legal perspective, this has
meant that the United Nations was to play a key role in upholding the law in
contemporary international relations.
It is almost a truism to observe that the realization of this objective cannot
be confronted in the same manner in the dawn of the twenty-first century as it
was originally foreseen in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The U.N.
has shifted its attention to new pending issues and has proposed innovative ways
of addressing them. The promotion of the rule of law at the international level
obviously lies at the heart of these contemporary endeavors. But, beyond the
direct efforts made to promote the concept of "l'tat de droit," the U.N.
constantly strives to build up an international rule of law when we have to
manage post-conflict situations and to reconcile peace and justice; or when we
explore new concepts, such as the "responsibility to protect," which are aimed at
ensuring greater respect of international law. I hope to show to you how the
Organization has been able to propose novel legal ways of responding to the
changing political environment, while maintaining a solid attachment to the
principles and mechanisms provided for under the Charter.
A. Promoting the Rule of Law at the International Level
The concept of the "rule of law" is today at the centre of the United Nations'
concerns. Many offices within the system, including my own, are involved in its
promotion. In view of the significance and diversity of the Organization's
involvement in this area, the Secretary-General proposed in 2006 to establish a
Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group to ensure the overall coordination
of the U.N. efforts. The Group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, and I
am a member together with other senior U.N. officials. Furthermore, the issues
relating to the rule of law are being discussed by Governments both in the
Security Council and in the General Assembly. These efforts are well-known
within the system and focus much of the attention of my Office every day. What
may, however, be less evident is that the "rule of law" is a theme that has always
been present in the Organization.
In the preamble of the Charter, the Peoples of the United Nations express
their determination "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained." It is in this perspective that the purposes and principles
proclaimed in the Charter are to be understood. Principles such as the sovereign
equality of States, the fulfillment in good faith of international obligations, the
peaceful settlement of disputes or the prohibition of the threat or use of force in
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international relations, constitute the foundations of an international society
based on the supremacy of the law, equality before the law, and accountability
under the law. As recently recalled by the Secretary-General in a report on
strengthening and coordinating U.N. rule of law activities, "the demand of the
Charter for a rule of law ... aims at the substitution of right for might"; as he
pointed out, "the equal protection of the law as the means to achieve freedom
from fear and freedom from want is the most sustainable form of protection,"
and "[p]erhaps, the United Nations contributions to such protection are its most
profound achievements." Today, the concept of the "rule of law" is present in
most of the areas of action of the Organization, from the protection of human
rights to the maintenance of peace and security, from the fight against poverty to
the most sensitive political affairs.
This concept, which is so familiar to us lawyers, has the effect of placing our
field of expertise at the very heart of the Organization's mission. This raises an
interesting question: how does the U.N. conceive what some have called the
"exceedingly elusive notion" of the rule of law?
Within the Organization, the "rule of law" has been described as:
"a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities,
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law,
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty,
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. ' ' 9
What is of particular interest-and plainly stems from the emphasis put on
the universality of the principles which inspired the Organization's action in this
area-is that the U.N. recognizes the existence of two interdependent dimensions
to the concept of the "rule of law," one national and the other international. This
interdependence is explicitly acknowledged in the Millennium Declaration,
whereby the Heads of State and Government affirmed their resolve to
"strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs." As
was authoritatively stated, this implies that "every nation that proclaims the rule
of law at home must respect it abroad and that every nation that insists on it
abroad must enforce it at home.""0
79. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies, 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
80. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for
All, 133, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
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The "rule of law" acts as a vector for the engagement of the Organization in
various areas of the international arena when properly combined with the
principles and purposes of the Charter. In the 2005 Outcome Document,
Member States acknowledged that "good governance and the rule of law at the
national and international levels are essential for sustained economic growth,
sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger,"'" and that
human rights, and the rule of law and democracy "are interlinked and mutually
reinforcing.,1 2 These general statements are accompanied by calls for action on
more specific issues of concern, such as the adherence to international treaties,
implementation of international law at the domestic level, the enhanced role of
the International Court of Justice in the peaceful settlement of disputes, the
protection of civilians, or the eradication of policies and practices which
discriminate against women. The Security Council, for its part, also expressed
support for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for rule of law
activities in the peacebuilding strategies in post-conflict societies. The Council
has amply emphasized the importance it attaches to the responsibility of States
to comply with their obligations to end impunity and to prosecute those
responsible for the most serious international crimes.83
This broad scope of the rule of law within the U.N. has been reaffirmed as
recently as last month, in the context of an open debate of the Security Council
on "the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of
international peace and security." That debate was proposed by the Mexican
presidency both with the objectives of "more strongly embedding the rule of law
and international law in the daily work of the Security Council" and of
"increasing the level of adherence to the rule of law and international law," both
of which were considered indispensable for the Council to fulfill its primary
responsibility. I participated in this debate and, as was apparent from the various
interventions, the U.N. has endorsed the idea that the promotion of the rule of
law may not be limited to specific situations or circumstances, but should
expand to cover the rule of law at the international level.
In sum, the concept of the rule of law in the U.N. embraces the most classical
and fundamental principles of the international legal order, and allows us to use
these principles to face the most urgent and contemporary concerns of the
international community.
Ms. O'Brien completed the first part of her keynote by discussing how the
U.N. Legal Office manages post-conflict situations by reconciling peace and
justice, promotes the "complementarity" of domestic and international justice
81. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 11,
U.N. Doc. A/62/1 (Aug. 31, 2007).
82. Id. 119.
83. Statement by the President of the Security Council dated June 22, 2006, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/28
(June 22, 2006).
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systems in the prosecution of perpetrators of the most serious crimes, and
explores new ways to ensure respect for the law, including the "responsibility to
protect."
2. Enhancing Respect for the Rule of Law at the United Nations
Let me now turn to the second part of my presentation, which-as I
mentioned before-will be devoted to enhancing respect for the rule of law
within the U.N.
As the Secretary-General has underlined, the U.N., as an organization
involved in setting norms and standards and advocating for the rule of law, must
itself "practice what it preaches." This implies that it should be legally
accountable for its actions, and that mechanisms are to be put in place in order
to ensure that the Organization acts according to the law. There are many
dimensions to this issue, which have included in the past years, for instance,
discussions in the Sixth Committee on the criminal accountability of U.N.
officials and experts on mission, or the reform of our internal system of
administration of justice. As for today, I would like to examine in more detail
two areas in which significant progress has recently been made: the
implementation of sanctions and the responsibility of international
organizations. Something indeed needs to be said as to the necessity for the U.N.
to face the impact that its acts may have on actors outside the system, even-or,
should I say-most importantly when these acts have prejudicial consequences.
A. Adapting the Regime of Sanctions
I will be very brief in addressing how the U.N. has adapted the regime of
sanctions which the Security Council has been using as an important tool in the
fight against terrorism. The issue has attracted numerous debates, both in
international and regional fora and in legal literature, and I would not like to
oversimplify the complexity of the matter. Allow me simply to emphasize
significant recent developments which, in my view, illustrate how the U.N.
constantly seeks to adapt its methods and processes.
It may certainly be argued that, in the turmoil following September 11 th,
and faced with a new kind of imminent threat against peace and security, the
U.N. may not have immediately paid sufficient attention to the guarantees to be
associated with the imposition of sanctions. Much has been said about the
external factors that have called the Organization to address this issue. One of
the most frequently mentioned among these external factors is certainly the
Judgment of September 3, 2008, rendered by the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Justice in the joined cases of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al
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Barakaat International Foundation." As you certainly are aware, the Court
annulled in this Judgment a regulation giving effect to Security Council
resolutions and ordering the freezing of the funds and other economic resources
of the persons and entities whose names appeared in the summary list drawn up
by the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee. The Court did so in part
because it concluded that the rights of the defense (in particular the right to be
heard) and the right to effective judicial review of those rights were not
respected in the circumstances of the case."
This Judgment undoubtedly marks an important development in the
consideration of the legal regime of sanctions. It would, however, be an unfair
assessment to consider that adaptations of the sanctions regimes developed by
the Security Council have only been triggered by such external elements. Even
before September 2008, the U.N. had taken significant steps to improve the
fundamental guarantees to be attached to the imposition of sanctions without
undermining their efficiency. In 2006, the Security Council had already
considerably rationalized the submissions by Member States of names of
individuals and entities to be placed in the sanctions Consolidated List and
instituted a focal point to receive requests for "delisting." In June 2008, the
Security Council had further improved the system of notifications associated
with listing procedures and directed a review of the Consolidated List. These
efforts have culminated with the adoption of Resolution 1904 (2009) of
December 17, 2009, by which the Security Council decided that an
Ombudsperson shall be appointed in order to assist the Sanctions Committee in
the consideration of delisting requests. The review of the regime of sanctions is,
in other words, an ongoing effort undertaken by the Security Council, which
shows once again how the Organization is active in seeking to ensure that its
activities are conducted in conformity with the rule of law.
B. Determining Responsibilities
Lastly, allow me to address the topic of international responsibility as
applied to the United Nations. In all fairness, this issue does not belong to the
traditional culture of the U.N. As an Organization striving for peace and justice,
the U.N. has been more used to the position of a victim or injured party than to
that of a wrongdoer. After all, it was after the murder of a U.N. agent, Count
Bernadotte, that the International Court of Justice, in its famous advisory
opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
84. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v.
Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351.
85. For a discussion of this case by international judges, see 2009 BIIJ REPORT, supra note 8, at 42-46
("Harmonizing International Politics with Fundamental Human Rights and the Rule of Law: the Kadi
judgment.").
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Nations, 6 expressly asserted the autonomous legal personality of the
Organization. However, with the multiplication and diversification of its
mandates and its increased involvement in the field, the question of the
responsibility of the U.N. necessarily arises.
In addressing this topic, we have to strike the right balance between two
imperatives. The first one is credibility: if the U.N. fails to assume its
responsibility, if it gives the impression that it ignores the consequences of its
acts, the confidence the Organization inspires may end up seriously damaged.
On the other hand, and this is the second imperative I was referring to, we need
to protect the Organization against the detrimental effects of claims against
actions on which the U.N. has had no actual control. If we do not collectively
resist the temptation to shift to the U.N. more than its share of responsibility, the
efficiency of the Organization, this need to deliver which is so central to the
work of the Secretary-General and its administration, will be durably hampered.
Allow me to illustrate the importance of this issue with a concrete example.
As you know, on May 31, 2007, the European Court of Human Rights adopted a
decision on two cases, Behrami and Saramati, brought against France and
Norway. I do not intend to discuss the merits of the cases under the special legal
regime created by the European Convention on Human Rights. In some respects
however, this decision draws upon significant aspects of the activity of the
United Nations.
The two cases concerned events that occurred in Kosovo. You will
remember that, in resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council authorized
Member States and relevant international organizations to establish an
international security presence in Kosovo-KFOR-as well as an international
civil presence named UNMIK. In Behrami, the applicants complained of the
killing and serious injury inflicted on two young brothers in a tragic accident
caused by the detonation of a cluster bomb, arguing that French KFOR troops
had failed to de-mine the site concerned. The Saramati case was based on
complaints relating to the arrest of the applicant by UNMIK police and his
extra-judicial detention by KFOR.
The decision is one of inadmissibility: the European Court finds that the
conduct of the United Nations falls beyond its jurisdiction ratione personae, as
the Organization has a legal personality separate from that of its Member States
and is not a party to the European Convention. The reasoning of the Court,
however, raises concerns. The Court considered, in particular, that conduct of
Member States carried out in the context of an operation under Chapter VII of
the Charter was "in principle" attributable to the U.N.. The Court based its
decision on its own evaluation of the "delegation" of Security Council powers,
coupled to an approach of the criterion of "effective control" for attribution of
86. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Apr. 11).
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conduct which has been recently criticized by the International Law
Commission.
It is worth adding that the reasoning of the Court has since been replicated
in a number of cases relating to very diverse types of involvement of the United
Nations. For instance, the European Court considered that the conduct of the
High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina was attributable to the U.N.87
The Behrami reasoning has also been extensively referred to, if not always
adopted, by certain national courts. In the Al-Jedda case for example,8 the
United Kingdom House of Lords was confronted with issues of detention in Iraq
by British troops belonging to the "multinational force under unified command"
authorized by Security Council resolution 1511(2003). The argument that the
conduct was attributable to the U.N. was rejected by all Lords with the
exception of one. Other Lords pointed to the fact that the force was not acting
under U.N. auspices; in doing so, some relied on Behrami's criterion of
"ultimate authority and control," thus basing their assessment on the European
Court's line of reasoning. More recently, two civil cases89 brought before the
District Court of The Hague raised the issue of the attribution of conduct carried
out by the Dutch Battalion supporting UNPROFOR during the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Dutch Court accepted The Netherlands' argument that the
impugned conduct was exclusively attributable to the U.N., since the forces
formed part of the UNPROFOR operation, which exercised operational
command and control over them.
There thus seems to be a trend in the case-law for a wide conception of
attribution of conduct to the U.N. The Organization does not intend in any way
to elude its responsibility, whenever this responsibility is actually entailed by a
conduct over which it has effective control. But it seems fair to acknowledge
that a broader conception of attribution will have significant implications on the
formulation of mandates and on the effective fulfillment of U.N. functions. The
Court's reasoning could, for example, be used to confer upon the U.N.
responsibility for conduct carried out in the context of peacekeeping operations
authorized by the Organization and operated by a coalition of the willing on
which the U.N. has no actual control. Any finding of this kind would have
significant implications not only for the Organization itself, but also for States
as members of the Organization who are ultimately responsible for its financing.
What is more, it could seriously hamper the capability of the Organization and
87. Beric v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 36357/04, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE6, 91 (2008) (decision on
admissibility).
88. R. v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58 (appeal taken from EWCA).
89. H.N. v. State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Def. and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Rechtbank's-
Gravenhage [HA ZA] [Dist. Court in the Hague], Sept. 10, 2008, 265615 / HA ZA 06-1671 (Neth.), M. M.-M.
v. State of Netherlands, Rechtbank's-Gravenhage [HA ZA] [Dist. Court in the Hague], Oct. 9, 2008, 265618 /
HA ZA 06-1672 (Neth.).
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the flexibility it requires to fulfill its key mission of maintaining international
peace and security.
I have chosen this example in order to better illustrate how the Organization
is constantly assessing its methods and procedures. Following the Behrami
decision, I have actually engaged my Office in a thorough internal review of the
past and current practice of the Organization regarding issues of international
responsibility. I have also committed to submit to the International Law
Commission-which is currently considering the topic of the responsibility of
international organizations-to submit our assessment of the issues arising from
the draft articles adopted by the Commission on first reading, including our
comments on the evolving jurisprudence generated by the Behrami decision. In
none of the instances I have just referred to has the U.N. been held accountable.
We cannot however satisfy ourselves with such short-sighted reasoning. As I
have striven to demonstrate today, the United Nations needs to lead by example.
Conclusion
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
In reaching the conclusion of this statement, I become aware that I have
imposed upon you a daunting journey through a wide number of very diverse
legal issues. In a sense, by so doing, I may have given you a taste of what a day
looks like at the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs. For these issues have one thing in
common: they represent the legal challenges facing the U.N. in the twenty-first
century. And as such, they are the challenges that the entire international legal
community, including this learned Institute, needs to face together in the years to
come.
Thank you very much.
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